Court Takes the Legs Right Out from Underneath Plaintiff's Seating Case

By Karin Cogbill

In the first significant ruling of its kind, the Los Angeles Superior Court in Bright v. 99¢ Only Stores granted the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s representative Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) allegations. The plaintiff, Eugina Bright, filed a complaint against 99¢ Only Stores in June 2009 alleging that the store failed to provide her, and all other cashiers, with suitable seating. In October 2009, the court granted the store’s demurrer prohibiting the plaintiff from pursing a suitable seating claim through PAGA (California Labor Code §§ 2698 et seq.). In November 2010, the court of appeal reversed and remanded the case.

Back at the trial court, the plaintiff represented that she intended to seek class certification for her PAGA claim; yet she ultimately failed to move for certification. Instead, the store proactively moved to strike the plaintiff’s representative allegations in order to prevent her from seeking to recover penalties on behalf of all other alleged “aggrieved” employees. The store first argued that the plaintiff was an inadequate representative of its other cashiers. The store submitted declarations from 376 of its cashiers, all of whom indicated they disagreed with the plaintiff’s demand that they be provided seats, and the plaintiff failed to provide even a single rebuttal declaration. The store also noted the plaintiff’s independent interests in recovering lost wages and her failure to reach out to even a single “aggrieved” employee she sought to represent.

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California Court of Appeal Permits Plaintiff to Proceed with Claim for Suitable Seats

ChairIn a case of first impression, a California court of appeal held in Bright v. 99¢ Only Stores, No. B220016 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2010) that the “suitable seats” provision of Wage Order 7-2001 may be enforced through the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, California Labor Code § 2698 et seq. (PAGA).

Plaintiff’s Complaint and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Eugina Bright, filed a class action complaint against her former employer 99¢ Only Stores. The plaintiff alleged that while employed as a cashier at 99¢ Only Stores she was not provided with a seat despite her contention that the nature of her work as a cashier reasonably permitted the use of a seat. The plaintiff based her claim for a seat on Wage Order 7-2001, Section 14 (entitled “Seats”), which provides:

A. All working employees shall be provided with suitable seats when the nature of the work reasonably permits the use of seats.

B. When employees are not engaged in the active duties of their employment and the nature of the work requires standing, an adequate number of suitable seats shall be placed in reasonable proximity to the work area and employees shall be permitted to use such seats when it does not interfere with the performance of their duties.

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Update to Significant PAGA Decision: Deleon Plaintiff Seeks Review by California Supreme Court

We recently reported a significant California Court of Appeals decision, marking what appears to be turning point in the development of California's Labor Code Private Attorney General Act ("PAGA"). In Deleon v. Verizon Wireless, the Second District Court of appeal addressed several unsettled PAGA issues. The Court's analysis has far-reaching consequences with respect to several issues, including (i) the settlement of individual and class-wide PAGA claims, (ii) the status of an "aggrieved employee" as a plaintiff, and (iii) the nature of PAGA representative actions.

On February 23, 2009, the plaintiff's in Deleon filed for review by the California Supreme Court. Employers are advised to monitor the Supreme Court's actions in this case, particularly those currently litigating purported PAGA claims. Unless and until the Supreme Court grants review, however, Deleon may still be cited as good law. For a more thorough analysis of the impact of the Deleon decision, see the Littler ASAP "Bounty Hunters" Lose Their State "Badge" as Court of Appeal Clarifies Several PAGA Issues.

This blog entry was authored by Vincent J. Mersich.
 

Trial Court's Dismissal of PAGA Claims Upheld

Deleon v. Verizon Wireless concerns a case where the employer had been previously sued under various sections of the California Labor Code for charging back commissions to its salespeople. No claims under the California Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) were alleged in the original complaint. That case settled in 2006, and the court certified a class for purposes of settlement. Nothing in the settlement agreement made reference to the PAGA. Rather, the agreement defined "released claims" to include all liabilities and penalties arising out of "any conduct, events, or transactions occurring during the class period." After the settlement, the plaintiff in Deleon sued the same employer, purportedly on behalf of the same employees, based on the same violations of the Labor Code, but this time seeking only penalties pursuant to the PAGA. The employer demurred to the second complaint, and the court of appeal upheld the trial court's dismissal of the second complaint based on res judicata. The recent Deleon decision is significant for employers in at least the following three ways:

Settlement Agreements. Even if an employer is settling a class action that has no PAGA claims, provided the employees release all "liabilities and penalties" arising out of "any conduct, events, or transactions” occurring in the class period, Deleon provides that the employer should be protected against any subsequent tag-along PAGA actions. More importantly, the employer need not designate any part of the settlement amount as settling PAGA claims, and no part of the settlement amount need be paid to the State of California in order to release non-asserted PAGA claims. On the other hand, if PAGA claims are a part of the complaint, the parties will most likely be required to designate some portion of the settlement amount as settling PAGA claims, and 75 percent of that amount should be paid to the state.

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