Mortgage Lender's Reasonable Reliance on DOL Opinion Letter Constitutes Good Faith

On September 30, 2009, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, in Henry v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 2009 WL 3199788, held that a mortgage lender-employer acted in good faith when it demonstrated that it had reasonably relied upon the September 2006 U.S. Department of Labor Opinion Letter when determining whether its loan officers qualified for the “administrative exemption” to the Fair Labor Standard Act and were therefore ineligible for overtime.

As discussed previously, the issue was initially determined in July by a federal magistrate judge who ruled that an employer’s reasonable reliance on the September 2006 DOL Opinion Letter, as established through affidavit testimony of corporate executives, constituted good faith as a matter of law.  This ruling, contained in the magistrate’s report and recommendation, was adopted and confirmed by the district court and, therefore, the employer faces no liability for potentially misclassifying its loan officers from the date of the DOL letter, September 8, 2006, onward. The court also adopted the magistrate’s decision denying the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment on the merits of the employer’s affirmative defense, based upon the exemption.

This entry was written by Andrew Voss.

Mortgage Lender's Good Faith Reliance Upon DOL Opinion Letter Regarding the Exempt Status of Loan Officers Shields Against Overtime Liability

On July 17, 2009, a federal magistrate judge sitting in the Eastern District of Michigan issued two significant rulings on pending motions for summary judgment in Henry v. Quicken Loans, Inc. The plaintiffs in Henry were employed as mortgage loan consultants (or “mortgage bankers”) for Quicken Loans, a large on-line mortgage lender. Quicken Loans classified its loan consultants as exempt from the overtime obligation imposed by the FLSA, in reliance upon the administrative exemption. The plaintiffs claimed, relying upon Quicken Loans’ hiring, training, and process documentation, as well as internal email, that they were primarily responsible for “selling” mortgage loans. If their primary duty was “sales,” the plaintiffs argued, they could not be considered exempt administrative employees.

In his first report and recommendation on cross-motions for summary judgment on the administrative exemption defense, the magistrate judge found an issue of fact regarding the loan consultants’ primary duty. The plaintiffs relied heavily upon internal corporate documents which emphasized the loan consultants’ role in the sale of mortgage loans. Quicken Loans, however, pointed to the U.S. Department of Labor’s September 2006 opinion letter, which found that mortgage loan officers qualified for the administrative exemption if their duties included such activities as working with customers to identify and secure a loan that is appropriate for the customers’ financial circumstances, collecting and analyzing customer financial information, and advising the customer regarding the risks and benefits of loan alternatives. According to the magistrate judge, a jury would have to decide whether the plaintiffs fall within the scope of the opinion letter, or whether they were primarily responsible for sales.

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