Wage & Hour Counsel : Wage & Hour Lawyer & Attorney : Littler Mendelson Law Firm : Employment Law, Labor Relations

By Christopher Anderson

The Tennessee General Assembly recently amended the state’s meal and rest break law to require meal breaks for tipped employees in the food and beverage industry. Fortunately, the new law also allows tipped employees to waive their right to meal breaks as long as employers follow a very specific process.

Under Tennessee law, employers must grant employees a 30-minute unpaid meal break unless the nature of the business provides “ample opportunity [for employees] to take an appropriate meal break.” Before the recent amendment, Tennessee employers in the food and beverage industry were not obligated to grant rest breaks to their tipped employees. In the interest of providing regulatory guidance to employers in the industry, the Tennessee Department of Labor determined that waiters and waitresses fall within the exception to the meal break requirement because, by the nature of the business in which they work, there is ample opportunity to take a meal break. As a result of the Tennessee DOL’s guidance, employers in the food and beverage industry were able to avoid disruptions in service caused by meal breaks and provide the uninterrupted attention that is vital to customer satisfaction.

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By Jennifer Robinson, Eric Stevens and Rachel Ross

As a general rule, the Fair Labor Standards Act does not require an employer to pay an employee’s travel time between home and their regular place of work. However, Tennessee employers should be aware of another travel time issue – Are employees serving on jury duty entitled to compensation for travel time to and from jury duty when the employee is not compensated for travel as part of the employee’s usual compensation? According to an Opinion just issued by the Tennessee Attorney General, the answer is YES, “subject to certain limited exceptions.”

TCA 22-4-106(b) requires, in pertinent part:

(b) Notwithstanding the excused absence as herein provided in subsection (a), the employee shall be entitled to the employee's usual compensation received from such employment; however, the employer has the discretion to deduct the amount of the fee or compensation the employee receives for serving as a juror. Moreover, no employer shall be required to compensate an employee for more time than was actually spent serving and traveling to and from jury duty. 

On its face, the new Opinion seems straightforward – employees should be paid their travel time for jury duty even if that same travel time would not be compensable if the employee was traveling to or from work. However, as with most broad “clarifications,” this Opinion leaves several open questions.

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Effective July 1, 2010, Tennessee has amended its wage payment statute, Tennessee Code section 50-2-103, to allow employers to pay their employees using prepaid debit cards if the following conditions are met:

• The employee has the ability to make at least one withdrawal or transfer each pay period without cost to the employee for any amount contained on the card; and
• The employer provides the employee with a full written disclosure of any fees that may apply.

Employees must be provided the option of being paid via direct deposit or prepaid debit card. If an employee elects to be paid by direct deposit but does not designate an account at a financial institution in a timely fashion for the transfer to occur, the employer may arrange to pay the employee via prepaid debit card.

This entry was written by Andrew Voss.

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Kellogg Company (Kellogg) was granted summary judgment and dismissal of claims raised by a manufacturing employee in its Rossville, Tennessee manufacturing plant. In Franklin v. Kellogg Company, C.A. No. 08-2268 (W.D.Tenn.), the district court held that time spent by manufacturing employees changing into and out of company-issued gear was noncompensable under Section 3(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. This is because Section 3(o) excludes time spent by employees donning and doffing “clothes” from compensable hours worked where such time is either explicitly addressed in a collective bargaining agreement, or by custom or practice established under a collective bargaining agreement.

Plaintiff Alice Franklin claimed that she was entitled to compensation for time spent changing into and out of company uniforms and other gear both prior to and after her work shifts. She sought to represent Kellogg employees on a nationwide basis. Ms. Franklin’s motion to certify a collective action under the FLSA, however, was rendered moot by the court’s finding in favor of Kellogg. As an initial matter, the court found that the company uniform and standard equipment used by the plaintiff constituted “clothes” under Section 3(o). The uniforms in question consisted of pants, snap front shirts and slip-resistant shoes and the standard equipment included hair nets, beard nets, safety glasses, ear plugs and bump caps. The court relied on its prior decision in Sisk v. Sara Lee Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 1001 (W.D.Tenn. 2008), holding that protective gear worn by meat processing employees fell under the definition of clothes under Section 3(o). It found that plaintiffs failed to present any compelling reason to reconsider that holding.

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