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The guards’ wage statement claim fared no better but for a different reason. The crux of this claim was that the wage statements did not specify how many hours guards worked beyond twelve hours in a day at “double time” or the wage paid at double time rates. For this alleged violation of the Labor Code, the guards sought civil penalties under California’s Private Attorney General Act (PAGA), which allows a single employee to seek penalties on behalf of all “aggrieved employees” for Labor Code violations. But to pursue such a claim in court, PAGA requires an employee to jump through a procedural hoop—pre-suit notification to the California Labor Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) of his or her claim. The plaintiff guard here had notified the LWDA of his rest break allegation, but he failed to mention any violation of the law requiring accurate wage statements. Having failed to jump through this hoop, the judge found that the plaintiff was not able to pursue this claim on a class basis, obviating the need for any analysis of the class certification request.

Rest break class actions have been among the most difficult to certify, and this case is yet another example of the individualized questions that arise when considering how and why some employees do not take rest breaks. This decision also demonstrates the value of employers being able to amass substantial evidence of compliance with the laws allegedly violated as well as proof of idiosyncratic supervisors or varying conditions that destroy the ability of plaintiff to offer common proof.

This entry was written by Alison Hightower.

Photo credit: Steve Cash

In reviewing the decertification motion, the court observed that the crux of the case was whether the MASMs were misclassified as exempt executive employees. Consequently, it was necessary for the court to review “the responsibilities and duties of a MASM” to determine whether that position qualified as exempt. The discovery conducted by Home Depot on this factor was critical to its successful decertification motion.

The court considered the MASMs’ deposition testimony, and concluded that “job responsibilities and duties varie[d] from MASM to MASM.” In reaching its conclusion, the court specifically relied upon the MASMs’ differing testimony about the following: (1) type of exempt work performed (directing and supervising employees, delegating work, planning work for employees, ordering inventory, and ensuring safety, security, and legal compliance within Home Depot stores); (2) authority over subordinate employees (hiring, promoting, evaluating, disciplining, and terminating employees); and (3) amount of time spent performing exempt work.

The court next identified three factors for consideration at the decertification stage: (1) disparate factual and employment settings; (2) defenses available to Home Depot; and, (3) fairness and procedural considerations. The court found all three factors for final collective action certification weighed in favor of decertification.

First, the court determined that there were substantial differences in the factual and employment settings of the MASMs, such that the court would be required to engage in numerous individualized determinations to discern whether each specific MASM qualified as an executive. The court also found that the plaintiffs could not rely on common proof evidence of Home Depot’s decision to classify all MASMs as exempt, Home Depot’s centralized corporate structure, the performance of non-exempt tasks by MASMs that overlapped with the responsibilities of non-exempt positions, or MASM compensation as compared to the nonexempt department supervisor’s compensation, because such factors did not establish the MASMs as similarly situated for FLSA purposes.

Second, the court recognized that Home Depot intended to present individualized evidence as to each MASM’s claims, and to raise contradictions between individual MASM’s written statements and deposition testimony. Third, the court noted its serious concerns about whether a collective action would be most efficient, and whether the court could “coherently manage” the collective action without prejudice to the parties, given Home Depot’s intention to explore individualized defenses. Accordingly, the court decertified the conditional collective action.

Finally, the court denied the MASMs’ request for subclasses for declaratory relief and training period claims. The court concluded that there was no authority supporting injunctive relief arising from Home Depot’s blanket policy of classifying all MASMs as exempt, without having first analyzed the appropriateness of the classification by testing the daily activities of the MASM position. In addition, the court noted that if the uniform classification of a position as exempt is not enough to establish similarly situated for FLSA purposes, as the court previously held in the decision, then it also does not support the creation of a subclass. The court also determined that the likelihood of dissimilarities during training would require an individualized case-by-case determination of whether each MASM was an executive during training.

This entry was written by Tracy Stott Pyles.

Photo credit: endopack

In Jaimez, the plaintiff moved to certify a number of claims on behalf of a class of drivers, including alleged claims for misclassification of drivers as exempt from overtime, failure to provide meal periods to the drivers, failure to authorize and permit drivers to take rest breaks, and failure to provide drivers with compliant pay stubs. In support of his motion, the plaintiff submitted nine declarations from drivers who claimed that: (1) they had been reclassified from exempt to non-exempt, (2) they had not been paid overtime before or after reclassification, (3) their managers had pressured them to complete their route within eight hours, leaving insufficient time for them to take meal periods or rest breaks, and (4) their pay stubs were inaccurate. The defendant submitted 25 declarations from putative class members indicating that the drivers had been paid all overtime wages due, had routinely been provided meal periods and rest breaks, and had been provided accurate pay stubs. The trial court denied class certification, finding: the named plaintiff (a convicted felon) was not an adequate class representative; common questions of fact did not predominate the dispute; and class action procedure would not be superior to individualized litigation.

Despite the high degree of deference California appellate courts routinely give trial court class certification decisions, the Jaimez court: reversed the trial court's order denying class certification; ordered the trial court to certify the class claims; and, because the court agreed the named plaintiff was an inadequate representative, ordered the trial court to permit the plaintiff to find an adequate class representative. The appellate court held that conflicts in putative class members' declarations regarding whether they had been afforded the opportunity to take meal periods and rest breaks did not raise individualized questions of fact. Instead, the plaintiffs’ declarations alone were sufficient to corroborate a common theory of liability – that the defendant failed to provide meal periods and rest breaks – and the defendant's conflicting declarations simply meant the defendant's ultimate liability would be reduced.

Daiohs asked the California Supreme Court to review the appellate court decision, or to at least depublish it. On May 12, the California Supreme Court denied both requests. This decision could have significant ramifications on meal period and rest break practices in California and employers are encouraged to speak to their employment counsel to discuss these issues in detail.

This entry was written by Julie Dunne.
 

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that certification of each claim was improper under Rule 23(b)(3) because individualized factual inquiries into whether each employee worked without compensation and, if so, for how long, would swamp any issues that were common to the proposed class. The court analyzed the gap period, break period and quantum meruit claims separately, but in each instance reached the same conclusion: that individualized inquiries would predominate with respect to each claim. Notable points made by the Eleventh Circuit in the discussion of each claim include the following:

Breach of Contract Claim (Gap Period)
• The time records the plaintiffs proposed to rely on did not provide common proof of any uncompensated work during gap periods, particularly in light of employee testimony about various non-work related activities that took place during gap periods and various personal reasons that employees listed for coming in early and staying late;
• Even if a contract to pay for such gap time existed (an issue the parties disputed that was not ruled on), an individualized defense existed as to whether an employee knew of FedEx’s policy prohibiting off-the-clock work and yet deliberately chose to engage in such work in breach of contract;
• Even if, as the plaintiffs asserted, the FLSA was incorporated into the alleged contract, an individualized inquiry would still be necessary to determine whether each employee voluntarily arrived early or stayed late, and whether the employee engaged in any work during that time (under 29 C.F.R. § 785.48(a) early or late clock punching may be disregarded if it was voluntary and no work was performed); and
• Even if, as the plaintiffs alleged, there was a policy requiring or encouraging employees to arrive early or stay late, it would not predominate individualized issues, as the record showed that many employees arrived early or stayed late voluntarily and purely for personal reasons.

Breach of Contract Claim (Break Period)
• The time records that the plaintiffs proposed to rely on might not be sufficient to prove that an employee actually worked during a break, which would then require individualized inquiries;
• Even if work occurred, there is no way to tell from those time records how long an employee worked during a break; and
• Even if a contract to pay for such break time existed (an issue the parties disputed that was not ruled on), an individualized defense existed as to whether an employee who worked during the break violated the terms of the contract.

Quantum Meruit Claim
• A quantum meruit claim is highly individualized and would require an inquiry into whether each employee expected compensation for non-work related tasks or for activities performed while the employee was supposed to be on break.

The Eleventh Circuit also affirmed the district court’s refusal to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(1)(A). The appellate court agreed that certification under this Rule is improper where, as here, the plaintiffs request compensatory damages in addition to injunctive relief. In fact, the court noted that the primary remedy sought by the plaintiffs was unquestionably monetary relief.

The Eleventh Circuit characterized Babineau as “round two” of the plaintiffs’ litigation against FedEx, because the same district court previously denied certification of a nationwide class of FedEx employees who asserted substantially similar claims in the matter of Clausnitzer, et al. v. Federal Express Corp., 248 F.R.D. 647 (S.D. Fla. 2008). The Eleventh Circuit referred to Babineau as an attempt by the plaintiffs to cure the defects that the district court identified in Clausnitzer, by limiting the scope of the class to Florida employees, adding the quantum meruit claim and altering the breach of contract claim. Nonetheless, as discussed above, the plaintiffs’ “round two” attempt at class certification has now been rejected as well.

This blog entry was authored by Aaron Reed.