Wage & Hour Counsel : Wage & Hour Lawyer & Attorney : Littler Mendelson Law Firm : Employment Law, Labor Relations

After a complaint was filed with the U.S. Department of Labor, that agency investigated the situation and found no violation of the FLSA. Likewise, the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas found no FLSA violation and granted Redland’s motion for summary judgment.

On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the employees argued that the FLSA prohibits an employer from changing an existing workweek for the purpose of reducing employee overtime, and that Redland’s claim of administrative efficiency was pretextual. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, noting that although the statute does not define workweek, a Department of Labor regulation provides a meaning to the term. Under federal regulations, a workweek is defined as:

a fixed and regularly reoccurring period of 168 hours – seven consecutive 24-hour periods. It need not coincide with the calendar week but may begin on any day and at any hour of the day . . . . Once the beginning time of an employee’s workweek is established, it remains fixed regardless of the schedule of hours worked by him.

Citing numerous cases, the Eighth Circuit opined that “an employer does not violate the FLSA merely because, under a consistently designated workweek, its employees earn fewer hours of overtime than they would if the workweek was more favorably aligned with their work schedules.” The court found the FLSA requires that “the starting date remain constant and that the employees not work more than 40 hours within the 168 hour week without receiving overtime compensation. After noting that it is “aware of no contrary authority,” the court held that “the FLSA does not prescribe how an employer must initially establish its ‘workweek’ for overtime purposes.”

Going further, the Eighth Circuit then held that the FLSA does not limit an employer’s ability to change an existing workweek designation so long as the change is intended to be permanent. Federal regulations provide that: “The beginning of the workweek may be changed if the change is intended to be permanent and is not designed to evade the overtime requirements of the Act.” The court found that no employees had contested the permanence, but rather argued that Redland had changed the workweek to evade the FLSA’s overtime requirement. The court disagreed that there was any such “intent” requirement in the FLSA, reasoning that contemporary authority holds that reducing payroll expenses through a reduction in overtime is not contrary to the FLSA’s purposes. The court explained that an employer can make scheduling changes to avoid overtime and still comport with the FLSA. Thus, the Eighth Circuit concluded that “[s]o long as the change is intended to be permanent, and it is implemented in accordance with the FLSA, the employer’s reasons for adopting the change are irrelevant.”

While the Eighth Circuit’s decision is illustrative on how at least one circuit court interprets the FLSA regulations, it is important to note that the result might be different under state law. In Seymore v. Metson Marine, Inc., a California Court of Appeal evaluated a similar situation under the California Labor Code and determined that employers may designate a workweek that differs from the schedules of their employees if the reason for the modified worksheet has a bona fide business reason “which does not include the primary objective of avoiding the obligations of overtime.”

The Eighth Circuit specifically referenced the analysis from Seymore and noted that that decision was premised on California law, which is more protective than the FLSA. The Eighth Circuit was quick to point out that the FLSA analysis by the Seymore court “was wrong.” The Eighth Circuit’s not-so-subtle language presents a cautionary tale for all wage and hour practitioners: avoid conflating the federal law controlling the application and interpretation of the FLSA with the state law that controls similar state wage and hour laws.

Photo credit: Matthew John Hollinshead

Finding that the settlement payment waived the technicians’ right to file suit, the Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Spring Break Louisiana. In doing so, the court relied heavily on the holding and analysis set forth in Martinez v. Bohls Equipment Company, a Western District of Texas decision that thoroughly examines the history of the FLSA, its amendment by the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, and subsequent interpretative case law, ultimately holding that “parties may reach private compromises as to FLSA claims where there is a bona fide dispute as to the amount of hours worked or compensation due.” (quoting Martinez). Applying that same rationale, the Fifth Circuit determined that the payment offered to and accepted by the technicians pursuant to the union’s settlement agreement operated as “an enforceable resolution . . . predicated on a bona fide dispute about time worked and not as a compromise of guaranteed FLSA rights themselves.”

Finally, although the Fifth Circuit recognized that its holding directly contravened the Eleventh Circuit’s 30-year-old decision in Lynn’s Food Stores, the court distinguished that case by noting that the plaintiffs in Lynn’s Food Stores were unaware at the time of the settlement of their FLSA rights, had not consulted with an attorney, and, in some cases, could not speak English. The lighting and rigging technicians, on the other hand, had already retained an attorney and filed suit by the time they received and cashed their settlement checks. Thus “[t]he money [the technicians] received and accepted, pursuant to the settlement agreement, for settlement of their bona fide dispute did not occur outside the context of a lawsuit, [and] hence the concerns the Eleventh Circuit expressed in Lynn’s Food Stores are not implicated.”

Photo credit: MBPhoto, Inc.

In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit first concluded that the district court correctly decided that the protective gear worn by U.S. Steel employees consisting of flame-retardant pants and jacket, work gloves, work boots, a hard hat, safety glasses, ear plugs and a hood, were plainly work clothes for the most part, and therefore “clothes” under the Act. To the extent the hard hat, glasses, and ear plugs were not technically “clothes,” the court summarily dismissed an argument that putting on this particular equipment qualified as compensable “work” because the time spent in such activity was de minimis. Accordingly, U.S. Steel was not required to compensate its employees for the time spent changing into and out of work clothes.

If clothes-changing time was not compensable, the Seventh Circuit decided that to require the employer to pay for the travel time – walking between the locker room and the work station – was “puzzling and paradoxical.” The court noted that the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 254, rendered time spent “walking, riding, or traveling” to and from the place an employee performs his “principal activity” non-compensable. If Section 3(o) had not applied, thereby making clothes-changing time compensable as a principal activity, the travel time would likewise have been compensable. But here, the employer and union had decided that clothes-changing time was not work time, and therefore need not be compensated. Therefore, changing clothes could not be a “principal activity” that the employee was employed to perform.

The Seventh Circuit noted the Supreme Court’s decision in Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247 (1956), holding that when an employer requires an employee to don and doff work clothes at the workplace, then donning and doffing are integral and indispensable to the employee’s primary duty, and therefore compensable under the Act. The Supreme Court’s decision in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005), extended this holding to conclude that time spent walking from a principal activity (changing clothes) to a work station is likewise compensable, and not within the exemption created by the Portal-to-Portal Act. But the Steiner Court noted the significance of the fact that there was no collective bargaining agreement in place that would make clothes-changing time non-compensable in that case. Section 3(o) permitted the parties by agreement to take clothes-changing time outside the scope of the employee’s “principal activity,” which is exactly what U.S. Steel and its unions had done. Because clothes-changing was non-compensable and not a “principal activity,” walking to the employees’ work stations was likewise non-compensable under section 254. The Seventh Circuit further grounded its analysis in the stated legislative purpose for enacting the Portal-to-Portal Act in 1947, and Congress’s concern with the disruption of the workplace caused by a series of Supreme Court decisions that had forced employers to compensate for travel time and clothes-changing time.

Finally, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged the shifting positions articulated by the U.S. Department of Labor on the meaning of the term “clothes” in Section 3(o) of the Act, and the compensability of travel time under these circumstances. During the Clinton Administration, the Department took a narrow view of the term, but broadened its definition in a subsequent opinion letter issued during the Bush Administration. After the change in administrations in 2009, the Department reverted to its earlier position, and also rejected the Bush Administration’s position on “principal activity.” Although “[s]uch oscillation is a normal phenomenon of American politics,” the Seventh Circuit found nothing in the Department’s position that could assist the court in determining the legal question – other than an echo of the plaintiff’s arguments and a noted disagreement with the previous administration’s position. Under these circumstances, the court concluded that it owed no deference to the Department’s interpretation of the statute.

Photo credit: Avatar_023

In that case the plaintiff worked as a medical technologist for Bostwick Laboratories. The plaintiff claimed that she and several coworkers met with the company’s chief operating officer to report that their supervisor was altering their timesheets to reflect that they had not worked the overtime that they had recorded, when they had worked the overtime hours. According to the plaintiff, the chief operating officer told them that he would look into the issue, but rather than resolving it, her employment was terminated on the following Monday. The plaintiff sued Bostwick Laboratories in the Eastern District of Virginia, claiming FLSA retaliation, among other things. Bostwick Laboratories moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that an employee’s informal internal company complaint regarding a possible FLSA violation was not protected activity under the FLSA. The district court agreed, based on the then-precedential Fourth Circuit decision in Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., and without having the guidance yet of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kasten, and dismissed the complaint. The plaintiff appealed.

The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that “filed any complaint” includes internal company complaints, joining the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits and leaving the Second Circuit’s minority position on this issue in doubt. In reaching its decision, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that protecting internal company complaints would further the remedial purposes of the FLSA and was consistent with agency enforcement positions.

While some circuits are still split on the issue of whether the FLSA retaliation protections apply to internal complaints, employers should investigate and remedy oral or written internal complaints regarding wage and hour violations, and strictly prohibit retaliation against those who make such complaints. For more information on FLSA retaliation, see the DOL’s recently posted Fact Sheet on FLSA retaliation.

Photo credit: Diego Cervo

In affirming the district court’s decision, the Fourth Circuit observed that the minimum wage and overtime provisions and the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA protect “employees,” and the term “employee” is not defined “in a vacuum,” but in relationship to an employer, i.e., “any individual employed by an employer.” The court noted that the FLSA's enforcement provision provides that “any employer” who violates the anti-retaliation provision is liable for legal and equitable remedies, and an action may be maintained against “any employer.” The court thus reasoned that an employee is given remedies for violation of the anti-retaliation provision as to his or her employer, and Dellinger could only state a claim if she could show that she was an employee and that SAIC was her employer. Because Dellinger was only an applicant whose application had been approved on a contingent basis and she never began work, the court concluded that she could not be an employee under the FLSA, which defines “employ” as “suffer or permit to work.”

Dellinger, the Secretary of Labor and the dissenting judge raised a number of arguments, all of which the court rejected. The court first rejected the argument that because the anti-retaliation provision prohibits “any person” from discharging or discriminating against “any employee” for filing or instituting an FLSA complaint or enforcement proceeding, Dellinger could sue “any person” for retaliation. While the court acknowledged that anti-retaliation provision does prohibit all “persons” from engaging in certain acts, including retaliation against employees, it noted that the enforcement provision does not authorize employees to sue “any person.” The court further noted that the use of the term “person” in the anti-retaliation provision is attributable to the fact that this section prohibits other acts not performed by employers, i.e., transporting hot goods, which is punishable by a criminal penalty, not a civil action.

The court also rejected the argument that the enforcement provision includes the remedies of “employment” and “reinstatement,” indicating that the FLSA protects prospective employees. The court reasoned that the remedy of “employment” could be afforded to a former employee hired back to a different position.

The court likewise rejected the argument that it should apply Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., which held that the definition of “employee” in Title VII included former employees, to extend the FLSA to applicants and prospective employees. The court considered Robinson to be inapposite because there was no dispute that the FLSA applied to former employees; rather, the issue here was whether the FLSA could extend to someone who had never worked for the employer.

The court also rejected the argument that Dellinger could sue SAIC because she was “any employee” insofar as she was her predecessor’s employee and SAIC was “any employer.” The court held that the purpose and text of the statute were consistent with the interpretation that it was referring only to an employer’s own employees. The court also declined to adopt the argument that Dellinger could be considered an “employee” of SAIC under the FLSA because, as the recipient of a contingent offer of employment, “there was no legitimate impediment between her and the imminent assumption of her job duties.”

While the court was sympathetic to Dellinger’s argument that prospective employers should not be able to discriminate against prospective employees for exercising their FLSA rights in the past, it held that it was not free to broaden the scope of the statute whose scope is clearly defined. In distinguishing other statutory frameworks, the court observed that the Secretary of Labor had not promulgated a regulation under the FLSA interpreting the term “employee” to include prospective employees and applicants.

We will continue to follow and report on legal developments on this important issue.

Photo credit: White Shade Photos

While it may sound simple to determine what it means to “change clothes,” the issue is not so simple, particularly when the clothing also protects the employee. Is an apron “clothing”? Is a hardhat? What about mesh gloves? Or arm guards? Steel-toed shoes? Where to draw the line? The Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor has shifted its opinion three times. First, in 1997 it took the position that protective safety equipment worn over apparel was not “clothing.” Then, in 2002 it took a 180 degree turn, declaring that “changing clothes” applies to “the putting on and taking off of the protective safety equipment typically worn in the meat packing industry. . . .” In 2010 the Division completed the circle by concluding that changing clothes “does not extend to protective equipment worn by employees that is required by law, by the employer, or due to the nature of the job.”

In Salazar, unionized employees of a turkey processing plant in Colorado wore aprons, plastic sleeves, gloves, hard hats, earplugs, and some even wore mesh gloves, knife holders and arm guards. They sought compensation for their time “donning” or “doffing” these items each day. In affirming summary judgment for the employer, the Tenth Circuit declined to defer to the Wage & Hour Division’s most recent interpretation of the law, or any of its interpretations, because it had reversed course three times. Moreover, the court declared the agency’s current position is “not . . . particularly well-reasoned.”

Instead, the court took a common sense approach, finding that the ordinary meaning of “clothes” encompassed all of the items worn by these plant workers, and rejecting any distinction based on whether the items are “ordinary,” “street clothes,” or worn for safety or protective purposes, as not “particularly coherent or workable.” The court also discarded the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit—the one federal circuit court that has ruled to the contrary—that “generic” protective clothing, such as boots, frocks and hard hats, should be distinguished from “unique” protective clothing, such as mesh gloves or knife holders. The “unique” equipment worn by these turkey plant workers was not viewed as sufficiently cumbersome, heavy or complicated to fall outside of the definition of “clothes.”

With this latest ruling, we now have six federal appellate circuit courts finding that donning and doffing protective equipment is not compensable work time under these circumstances, and one going the other way. But the battle over what constitutes compensable time changing “clothes” no doubt will continue to rage, at least until more cases clearly delineate when employees must be paid for putting on or taking off their protective equipment.

Photo credit: Matt Collingwood

Plaintiffs have urged courts to reject the “half time” method in favor of the so-called “time and a half” method, which results in much larger damages awards. The “time and a half” method divides the employee’s weekly salary by a fixed number of hours (typically 40) to determine a fixed weekly regular rate. The employee is then awarded 1.5 times that rate for all hours worked each week in excess of that fixed number.

While some district courts have accepted plaintiffs’ arguments in favor of the “time and a half” method, the Supreme Court’s decision not to disrupt the Seventh Circuit’s endorsement of the “half time” method was not surprising. Four other circuit courts and the U.S. Department of Labor have approved the “half time” method, and no circuit court has taken a contrary position. See Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, LLC, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 702 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2011); Clements v. Serco, Inc., 530 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 2008); Valerio v. Putnam Assocs., Inc., 173 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 1999); Blackmon v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 835 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1988); Wage and Hour Opinion Letter, FLSA 2009-3 (Jan. 14, 2009).

This entry was written by Robert W. Pritchard.

The court found that the visa, travel, and recruitment expenses primarily benefited the employer and that, as per U.S. Department of Labor regulations, the employer must reimburse the workers for those costs if the workers would otherwise effectively receive sub-minimum wage compensation. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 531.3(d), 531.35.

The court relied heavily on the fact that a 2009 Department of Labor Field Assistance Bulletin declared that employers must reimburse H-2B visa workers for the costs of transportation, obtaining a visa, and third-party recruiters whose services the employer retains. The Field Assistance Bulletin reasoned that the costs of transporting H-2B workers and of obtaining an H-2B visa primarily benefit the employer because the H-2B visa program provides “greater-than-normal” benefits to the employer, since such workers are available to an employer only if it attests that no comparable domestic workers are available. In concluding that the recruitment costs primarily benefited the employer, the district court emphasized that the employer had retained the third-party recruiter’s services.

The courts have been divided on this issue. The Eleventh Circuit has similarly ruled that travel and visa expenses must be reimbursed when a worker’s effective wage received would otherwise be below minimum wage. See Morante-Navarro v. T&Y Pine Straw, Inc., 350 F.3d 1163, 1166 n.2 (11th Cir. 2003). The Fifth Circuit, however, has held to the contrary. See Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels, 622 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc).

This entry was written by Bruce Millman and Nicholas Ortiz.

Photo credit: oddrose
 

A vacation or sick leave buy-back program typically affords an employee the opportunity to cash-out his or her unused vacation or sick leave benefits. Such programs incentivize employees to work rather than take unnecessary vacation or sick leave (in order to retain the pay benefits). Employers also utilize these programs to save on the cost of overtime and per-diem workers. In Chavez, the City’s employees were subject to such a vacation and sick leave buy-back program. However, when the City would determine its employees’ overtime rate by calculating the employees’ regular rate to include “straight time” and add-on payments, it did not include vacation or sick leave buy-backs.

In its analysis, the Tenth Circuit first noted that pay for vacation and sick leave actually taken is not part of the FLSA’s regular rate calculation. Regarding the issue that arises when an employee works instead of taking his of her vacation or sick leave day, the court agreed with the Department of Labor’s position on the matter – vacation buy-back is not part of the regular rate, but sick leave buy-back is. According to the Department, vacation leave pay should not be included in the regular rate because it is not compensation for actual work, whereas sick leave pay should be included in the regular rate because it is analogous to an attendance bonus.

There is somewhat of a circuit split as to whether sick leave buy-backs should be included in the regular rate. For instance, the Sixth Circuit has held that sick leave buy-backs should not be included because “awards for nonuse of sick leave are similar to payments made when no work is performed due to illness...” Featsent v. City of Youngstown, 70 F.3d 900, 905 (6th Cir. 1995). Thus, Chavez represents the Tenth Circuit’s split from the Sixth Circuit, and joining with the Eighth Circuit and Department of Labor, in holding that sick leave buy-backs should indeed be included in an employer’s calculation of the FLSA regular rate.

This entry was written by Milton Castro.

Image credit: scherbet

The PSRs were supported in their appeal by an amicus filing by the U.S. Department of Labor, in which the Secretary argued that PSRs could not meet the “outside sales” exemption because they do not “make sales.” The DOL argued that as a result of the highly regulated nature of the pharmaceutical industry, PSRs merely promote pharmaceutical products to physicians, but those products are only thereafter purchased by a patient from a pharmacy. Thus, according to the DOL, the PSR does not “in any sense” make the sale of the product. In 2010, the Second Circuit accepted the DOL’s position and held that PSRs could not qualify for the outside sales exemption. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litig., 611 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2010).

The Ninth Circuit was not impressed with this reasoning, concluding that it owed “no deference” to the DOL’s position. The court first expressed frustration that the DOL’s regulations merely paraphrased the statutory language (i.e., a “sale” means a “sale”) without setting forth a particular test for “sale” or instructing employers to look for indicia of sales. Then, the court criticized the DOL’s attempt “to draft a new interpretation of the FLSA’s language” in an amicus brief, noting that giving controlling deference to interpretations expressed for the first time in case-by-case amicus filings would effectively authorize the bypassing of the notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act.

After resoundingly rejecting the DOL’s approach to this issue, the court of appeals took the final step and held that the DOL’s position was plainly erroneous. The court viewed the term “sale” in the FLSA in a “commonsensical” fashion, noting that in light of the “structure and realities of the heavily regulated pharmaceutical industry” PSRs do, in fact, make sales. The court concluded that in this industry, the “sale” is the non-binding commitment from the physician to prescribe the PSR’s assigned product when medically appropriate. Thus, PSRs make “sales” and qualify for the outside sales exemption.

Finally, the court took note of the DOL’s “acquiescence” to the classification of PSRs as exempt for more than seventy years. Quoting Judge Posner, the court reasoned that while it is “possible for an entire industry to be in violation of the [FSLA] for a long time without the Labor Department noticing[, the] more plausible hypothesis is that the ... industry has been left alone” because DOL believed its practices were lawful. The court criticized that the DOL’s “about-face” position, “expressed only in ad hoc amicus filings, is not enough to overcome decades of DOL nonfeasance and the consistent message to employers that a salesman is someone who ‘in some sense’ sells.” The court concluded that the DOL’s argument “fails to account for industry customs and emphasizes formalism over practicality.”

The court’s holding regarding the status of PSRs under the FLSA’s outside sales exemption was significant in its own right. But the court’s strong rebuke of the DOL’s attempt to express its position on a critical wage and hour issue for the first time in an amicus filing may have far greater implications. Employers who have been concerned about the DOL’s recent policy shifts on a variety of issues, announced in amicus filings and “Administrator Interpretations,” now have an unlikely ally in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In light of the conflicting opinions on the exempt status of PSRs, however, it may only be a matter of time before the Supreme Court agrees to resolve this dispute once and for all.

This entry was written by Robert Pritchard.

Photo credit: Two Humans

The rules are a bit more complex for exempt employees, however, who must be paid on a salary basis. The general rule is that exempt employees must be paid their full salary for any week in which they perform any work, unless a deduction is specifically permitted under 29 C.F.R. § 541.602(b). Section 541.602(b)(1) allows deductions for full-day absences taken for “personal reasons.” But, is a snow day a “personal reason”?

The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) addressed this issue in two Opinion Letters issued in 2005. DOL Opinion Letter FLSA2005-46 provides that deductions may be made from an exempt employee’s salary if the employer is open for business and the employee chooses not to report to work: "The Department of Labor considers an absence due to adverse weather conditions, such as when transportation difficulties experienced during a snow emergency cause an employee to choose not to report for work for the day even though the employer is open for business, an absence for personal reasons.” The DOL cautioned, however, that such “personal reasons” deductions “must be in full-day increments (not partial day deductions).”

Further, “[n]o deductions from salary can be made if the employer closes operations – this is considered an impermissible deduction "for absences occasioned by the employer or the operating requirements of the business."

Even when an employer closes operations, however, employees can be required to use accrued paid leave, such as paid vacation or a paid leave bank. DOL Opinion Letter FLSA2005-41 states that, since employers are not required under the FLSA to provide any paid leave to employees, “there is no prohibition on an employer giving vacation time and later requiring that such vacation time be taken on a specific day(s).” Therefore, an employer may direct exempt employees “to take vacation or debit their leave bank account” when the office or operations are closed due to inclement weather or other disasters, “whether for a full or partial day’s absence, provided the employees receive in payment an amount equal to their guaranteed salary.”

Cutting through the fog, the DOL’s guidance can be summarized in three simple rules:

1. Non-exempt employees need not be paid when they do not work due to inclement weather or a disaster under the FLSA.
2. If the company is open for business, an employer may make deductions, in full-day increments, from the salary of exempt employees who do not come to work due to inclement weather or a disasters.
3. If the company closes operations, the employer cannot make deductions from salary, but can require the employee to use accrued paid leave, either in partial-day or full-day increments.

This entry was written by Tammy McCutchen.

Photo credit: Randen Pederson

Kevin Kasten worked at a Saint-Gobain manufacturing plant in Wisconsin. He was issued three warnings for failing to properly clock in and out, and was suspended and then terminated in connection with a fourth incident. He claimed that at the time of his warnings and suspension, he told his supervisors and a Human Resources Generalist that the location of the time clocks was illegal because it prevented employees from being paid for time spent donning and doffing their required protective gear, and suggested to one supervisor that he might file a lawsuit. Following his termination, he sued Saint-Gobain, claiming that his employment was terminated in retaliation for his complaints in violation of the FLSA.

The Western District of Wisconsin dismissed the case, holding that unwritten oral complaints are not protected activity under the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The Seventh Circuit first held that “the plain language of the statute indicates that internal, intra-company complaints are protected,” based on the use of the word “any” before “complaint,” joining the majority of Circuit Courts that have considered the issue. 570 F.3d at 838.¹ However, the court then reasoned that the use of the term “filed” implies a writing and held that unwritten oral internal complaints are not protected activity under the FLSA. 570 F.3d at 839. The court rejected the argument made by Kasten and the Secretary of Labor in an amicus brief that “filed” should be interpreted as “to submit.” Id. The court also reasoned that when Congress wants to protect retaliation more broadly, it knows how to do so, for example in Title VII, which prohibits retaliation because one has “opposed any practice.” 570 F.3d at 840. The court thus affirmed the dismissal of the Complaint.

The Supreme Court granted review to address the Circuit split on the interpretation of “filed any complaint.” At oral argument today the Court did not allow much in the way of argument, peppering the attorneys with hypotheticals, and hinting at several possible outcomes:

• Several Justices raised the possibility that the Court could hold that internal complaints are not protected at all, siding with the minority of Circuit Courts on that issue.
• If internal complaints can constitute protected activity, Justice Ginsburg credited the argument that every other time the word “file” is used in the FLSA, it refers to a writing and allowing oral internal complaints would deviate from the standard meaning of the term in the statute at issue. This would be a reason to affirm the Seventh Circuit’s decision, holding that only written internal complaints are protected.
• If internal oral complaints can constitute protected activity, the Justices asked the parties to identify a standard to qualify an oral complaint as protected activity. They used the example of an oral complaint to a supervisor at a cocktail party and seemed uncomfortable with the possibility that this could be protected activity. Justices Alito and Sotomayor probed whether “filed any complaint” may incorporate whatever complaint procedures the company has. Alternatively, Justice Breyer focused on the extent of the formality of the complaint, expressing a concern that a tap on the shoulder raising a complaint could go unnoticed by a supervisor. In response, an objective standard was proposed: “whether a reasonable person would have understood the employee to have submitted a complaint.”

In sum, it appears that if the Court allows internal oral complaints to qualify as protected activity, it is likely to impose a standard that ensures that employers have sufficient notice of the complaint. Stay tuned!

This entry was written by Martha Keon.
 

¹ But see Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q, Co., Inc., 28 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000) (the FLSA’s “statutory language clearly places limits on the range of retaliation proscribed by the act.”); Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993) (The plain language of this provision limits the cause of action to retaliation for filing formal complaints, instituting a proceeding, or testifying, but does not encompass complaints made to a supervisor”).

Polycarpe was a consolidated appeal of six Florida cases in which the district courts found that the FLSA did not apply because of insufficient interstate commerce. Each court’s finding was based on the fact that the employer had purchased its “goods” and “materials” intrastate. Some of the courts also held that the employees had not handled the necessary types of goods or materials. According to the Eleventh Circuit, however, each of these findings resulted from an “erroneous” interpretation of the FLSA. The case is notable for the court’s rejection of the “coming to rest” doctrine and interpretation of “materials” under the FLSA.

Rejecting the “Coming to Rest” Doctrine

The Fair Labor Standards Act  applies to two types of employers: 1) those with employees engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for commerce; and 2) those with employees “handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person.”¹ In Polycarpe, the lower courts further limited the FLSA’s scope by following the “coming to rest doctrine,” which states that the FLSA does not apply to those employees who handle goods or materials that , prior to the employer’s acquisition, have already come to rest within the state. The Eleventh Circuit, however, found that the “coming to rest doctrine” was inconsistent with the FLSA as currently amended and thus held that, on remand, the district court in each case must decide whether the goods or materials were “at any time” produced in or moved interstate.

Defining “Materials”

Because some of the lower courts’ decisions in Polycarpe were based on interpretation of and the interplay between “goods” and “materials,” the court discussed each term at length and provided guidance on how lower courts should distinguish between the two. Of particular note is the court’s discussion of “materials,” given that the FLSA contains no definition of the term. Consulting the FLSA’s legislative history, Department of Labor regulations, and even Webster’s Dictionary, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that “materials” means “tools or other articles necessary for doing or making something.” Additionally, the court held that determining whether an item may be included in the term “materials” requires a 2-part test: “1) whether, in the context of its use, the item fits within the ordinary definition of ‘materials’ under the FLSA; and 2) whether the item is being used commercially in the employer’s business.” Discussing the first part of its test, the court gave the example of china plates which, if used by a caterer at a client’s banquet, would count as “materials,” but if simply sold as stand-alone items, would count as “goods.” As for the second part of the test, the court explained that the item must have a “significant connection” to the employer’s business. Thus, china plates would have a significant connection to a caterer’s business, but the same plates would not count as “materials” if used by an accounting firm as objects of decoration.

This entry was written by Milton Castro.

¹Both of these scenarios assume a $500,000 annual gross volume of sales. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A).

When the case was considered by the district court, it dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims, finding the Reps were exempt employees under both the “outside sales” and “administrative” exemptions set forth in the FLSA. Analyzing first the outside sales exemption, the district court concluded that even though the Reps “may not ‘sell’” in a “technical[ ]” sense, they do “make sales in the sense that sales are made in the pharmaceutical industry” and therefore they meet the “spirit and the letter” of the outside sales exemption. The district court also found that the Reps meet the administrative exemption, because they “exercise discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance” when they meet with physicians, provide them with information about the company’s products, and attempt to get commitments to prescribe the products. The Second Circuit reversed and held that the Reps do not meet either exemption.

Outside Sales Exemption

The Second Circuit concluded that the Novartis Reps do not meet the requirements of the outside sales exemption because they do not “make sales.” The court relied heavily on the Secretary of Labor’s amicus curiae position that a “sale” requires an exchange of consideration between buyer and seller and that, at best, Reps simply seek a positive affirmation from physicians that they will prescribe Novartis’s products in the future.

Although Novartis argued that the preamble to the regulations accompanying the FLSA provides that “commitments to buy” may constitute “making sales” under the exemption, the court rejected the argument as applied to this case. It held that “[t]he type of ‘commitment’ the Reps seek and sometimes receive from physicians is not a commitment ‘to buy’ and is not even a binding commitment to prescribe.”

Administrative Exemption

The plaintiffs also challenged the application of the administrative exemption based on the degree of discretion the Novartis Reps have in the performance of their duties. The Second Circuit again deferred to the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of the regulations and her position regarding their application to the facts of the case. It noted that, despite the importance of the Reps’ efforts to promote the company’s products, there was “no evidence in the record that the Reps have any authority to formulate, affect, interpret, or implement Novartis’s management policies or its operating practices, or that they are involved in planning Novartis’s long-term or short-term business objectives, or that they carry out major assignments in conducting the operations of Novartis’s business, or that they have any authority to commit Novartis in matters that have significant financial impact.” Instead, the Second Circuit accepted the plaintiffs’ claim that they do “low-level discretionless marketing work, strictly controlled by Novartis” and concluded that they did not exercise sufficient discretion and independent judgment to satisfy the administrative exemption. 

This entry was written by Lori Alexander, Michael Harvey, and Theresa Waugh.

¹ On the same day the In re Novartis ruling was issued (July 6, 2010), the Second Circuit also issued a summary order in Kuzinski v. Schering Corp., 2d Cir. No. 09-1945-cv, affirming the district court’s denial of summary judgment in a similar case.

Providing context for its decision, the court noted that Congress intended to exclude certain pre- and post-shift activities from work time when it enacted the Portal-to-Portal Act to amend the Fair Labor Standards Act. Under that amendment, as further stated in a persuasive 2006 DOL memorandum, changing clothes under usual circumstances is not compensable. In this case, the City had a policy of allowing officers to dress wherever they preferred, including at home, but required motorcycle officers to dress at home. The Court agreed that to the extent officers elected to dress at work, their decision was strictly a matter of employee convenience, and, as a result, their decision to change clothes at work did not render that time compensable.

The court recognized that previous decisions from the United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit allowed compensation for donning and doffing, but in all those cases, changing clothes had to be performed on the employer's premises because of the nature of the work, a policy of the employer, or applicable law. Those cases provided the following three-part test to assess whether pre- and post-shift activities are compensable: (1) does the activity constitute "work"? (2) is the activity an "integral and indispensable duty" of the job?, and (3) is the activity so insignificant in scope and duration as to be excluded from compensability as de minimis?

The court expressed doubt whether the act of changing in and out of a uniform and gear constituted "work," but proceeded to the second prong of the test where the officers' argument "fatally falter[ed]." To be "integral and indispensable, a pre- or post-shift activity must be "necessary to the principal work performed and done for the benefit of the employer." Both the majority and the dissent deemed that the act of donning and doffing a uniform was not integral to the job and, therefore, was not compensable. The majority noted that, although there was no dispute that the uniform and gear was required, the process of donning and doffing was not required to occur at work, and was equally effective whether performed at home or work. There was no mutual obligation fulfilled by donning and doffing at work, and the ultimate decision was a matter of convenience to the employee, not the employer. The dissent also recognized that the uniform may connote authority but does "not assist the officers in making arrests, interviewing witnesses or writing reports," and, therefore, is not integral.

The majority considered the gear used by officers in the same context as (and as part of) their uniform and found it to be indispensable but not integral to the principal duty of law enforcement. The dissent reasoned that the police gear assisted officers in the performance of their principal duty, and, consequently, was both indispensable and integral. The dissent further noted that the time spent donning and doffing gear was most likely a matter of only "seconds, or a few minutes," which would make that time non-compensable as de minimis. The dissent concluded that the case should be remanded because the record does not contain evidence of the amount of time actually required for donning and doffing gear.

This decision is significant for private employers as well. To the extent any employer requires its employees to wear a uniform (or gear), this decision provides a framework for determining whether an employee is entitled to compensation. Although certain factors or set of facts may lead to variations, employers requiring its employees to don and doff uniform and gear at work are likely required to compensate employees for that time—provided it is not de minimis—but employees are generally not entitled to compensation if they have the right to change at home at the beginning and end of their workday.
 

This entry was written by Laurent Badoux.

In Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2010-1, the DOL focused on the “production versus administrative” dichotomy in determining that mortgage loan officers are production workers whose primary duty is making sales, as opposed to administrative workers whose work is directly related to the management or general business operations of their employer or their employer’s customers. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.200.

The DOL relied on the following factors in reaching its conclusion:

• The primary job duties of mortgage loan officers – including collecting financial information from customers, entering it into the computer program to determine what particular loan products might be available to that customer, and explaining the terms of the available options and the pros and cons of each option, so that a sale can be made – constitute the production work of an employer engaged in selling or brokering mortgage loan products;
• Mortgage loan officers are paid primarily by commissions;
• Employers often train their mortgage loan officers in sales techniques and evaluate their performance on the basis of their sales volume;
• Many employers defend against FLSA lawsuits brought by mortgage loan officers by arguing that they are exempt as outside sales employees, thus conceding that their primary duty is sales; and
• Courts have repeatedly held that mortgage loan officers who work inside their employer’s place of business have a primary duty of sales.

The Wage and Hour Division announced that its new Administrator Interpretations “will set forth a general interpretation of the law and regulations, applicable across-the-board to all those affected by the provision in issue. Guidance in this form will be useful in clarifying the law as it relates to an entire industry, a category of employees, or to all employees.” Although the DOL will continue to respond to requests for opinion letters, such responses will be limited to providing references to relevant statutes, regulations, interpretations and cases and will no longer include an analysis of the specific facts presented.

This entry was written by Stephanie L. Hankin.

In addition, the proposed regulations would “modernize” certain recordkeeping requirements by allowing for “automated and electronic recordkeeping systems and methods to take the place of mandatory paper records that are currently required in some instances for employees” who work from home.

The DOL anticipates issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking in August of 2010.

This entry was written by Christopher Kaczmarek.

Under the FLSA, compensation for overtime need not be provided to “any employee...in the capacity as an outside salesperson.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). To qualify as an outside salesperson, (1) the employee’s “primary duty” must be “making sales” or “obtaining orders or contracts,” and (2) he or she must customarily and regularly be engaged away from the employer’s place of business in performing such duty. 29 C.F.R § 541.500(a). Both parties agreed that PSRs met the second requirement, so the only disputed issue was whether their primary duty was making sales.

The FLSA defines sales as “any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(k). Moreover, sales include “the transfer of title to tangible property, and in certain cases, of tangible and valuable evidences of intangible property.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b). Whether an employee makes sales requires an objective analysis, and according to the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) making sales includes “obtain[ing] a commitment to buy from the customer,” which resulted in the salesperson being “credited with the sale.” U.S. Department of Labor, Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22122, 22162 (Apr. 23, 2004). According to the court, under the DOL regulations, there is no requirement that commitments be binding. All that is required is that a sale be made “in some sense.”

In Christopher, the PSRs argued that they did not make sales because they did not consummate transactions or take orders. Instead, they claimed they merely promoted products. Moreover, PSRs contended their activities did not constitute sales because the U.S. Food and Drug Administration expressly prohibited pharmaceutical companies from selling directly to physicians or patients. According to the PSRs, sales only occurred between the pharmaceutical company and wholesalers.

The court noted that opinions differed among the federal courts whether PSRs made sales. A federal court in Connecticut concluded that PSRs did not qualify for the exemption because they could not sell, and physicians could not buy, products. Ruggeri v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., 585 F. Supp. 2d 254, 268 (D. Conn. 2008). However, a court in New York held that PSRs were exempt because they were credited with sales when physicians wrote prescriptions. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litigation, 593 F. Supp. 2d 637, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit). To determine whether PSRs qualified as outside salespeople, the court in Christopher looked to the rationale behind the outside sales exemption and also examined the position in the context of the pharmaceutical industry.

According to the court, the characteristics of PSRs justified exemption. PSRs were compensated well above the federal minimum wage (up to $100,000 per year), received fringe benefits like incentive bonuses in lieu of overtime, were unsupervised, and had better opportunities for advancement than non-exempt employees. Additionally, the kind of work they performed was “difficult to standardize to any time frame and could not be easily spread to other workers after 40 hours in a week, making compliance with overtime provisions difficult.” (quoting U.S. Department of Labor, 69 Fed. Reg. at 22124.)

The court observed that although the FLSA was enacted prior to the development of the pharmaceutical sales industry, it was intentionally broad to “address a multiplicity of industries found in the national economy and accordingly provide flexibility in the definition of a ‘sale.’” Moreover, the industry’s unique nature, i.e., the prohibition of direct sales, shifted the focus of sales efforts from the consumer to the physician, thereby making “[a] PSR’s ultimate goal [the] close [of] an encounter with a physician by obtaining a non-binding commitment from the physician to prescribe the PSR’s assigned product.” PSRs worked longer and irregular hours to generate sales in their territory for which they received compensation in the form of bonuses. The court concluded that PSRs “plainly and unmistakably fit within the terms of the exemption” because they engaged in “the functional equivalent of an outside salesperson and to hold otherwise is to ignore reality in favor of form over substance.”

The exempt status of pharmaceutical sales representatives continues to be litigated in courts across the country, and the issue is not settled. In the Novartis appeal referenced above, the U.S. Department of Labor filed an amicus brief arguing that pharmaceutical sales representatives do not qualify for the “outside sales” exemption. 

This entry was written by Robert Pritchard.

¹ Note: In the decision, SmithKlineBeecham is spelled as SmithKleinBeecham, which is an error.

Image credit: Alan Smithee

With this announcement, Secretary Solis promised, "America's workers should rest assured that protecting worker rights is a top priority at the Department of Labor." Her press release warned, "[t]here is no excuse for employers who disregard federal labor standards--especially those that are designed to protect the most vulnerable in the workplace."

Broad Investigative Powers

The Department's Wage and Hour Division investigates allegations that employers failed to pay minimum wage or overtime, as well as alleged misclassification of employees as exempt or independent contractors.¹ DOL investigations can be triggered by complaints from employees, unions, or competitors, and routine audits also can be performed, often focusing on a particular industry or type of employer.

The Department has broad investigative powers, including the power to subpoena employment records. Assuming wage and hour violations are discovered, the Department will seek a settlement. If an out-of-court agreement is not reached, the Department can sue to enjoin an employer's violation of the law as well as to compel the payment of back pay to all employees. The Department also has the power to seek reinstatement with back pay of any individual employee who was discharged for attempting to enforce the law.

Should the Department bring suit and prevail, it will recover liquidated damages equal to the unpaid wages the employer owes, unless the employer can prove that it acted in good faith with a reasonable belief that its pay practices complied with the law. Interest and attorney's fees are likely to be awarded as well, even if liquidated damages are not.

Significant Settlements

The threat of such enforcement actions can result in employers agreeing to settlements that provide significant recoveries. For instance, in July 2009, the Department announced a settlement of almost $750,000 with a convenience store chain in nine states accused of failing to properly include performance-related bonuses in the regular rate used to calculate overtime pay.

The Department also is planning a "public awareness campaign" to inform workers of their "rights," which presumably also will assist the Department in finding errant employers to investigate and prosecute.

Wake-Up Call

The federal government's increased manpower and desire to enforce federal labor standards should be a wake up call to United States employers to ensure that their procedures and practices comply with federal labor laws.

Audits conducted by or through counsel can catch technical problems with pay practices, recordkeeping, and employee classification that can be corrected to reduce exposure. Training of managers in employment laws such as when overtime is required can avoid violations caused by managers' ignorance of legal obligations.

These proactive steps can save employers the expense and embarrassment of reacting to a government investigation or a costly class action.

This entry was written by Alison Hightower.

¹ The Wage and Hour Division also governs the hours and conditions for employment of children under 16 years old and it enforces the labor standards provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that apply to aliens authorized to work in the U.S. under certain nonimmigrant visa programs.

In Re Novartis is a consolidated class action brought by Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives (“Reps”) from California, New York and other states against Novartis Pharmaceutical Corporation, one of the largest drug manufacturers in the United States. Claiming that they were misclassified as exempt employees, the Reps seek overtime wages for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek.

The Meaning of “Sales”

In the first of two justifications for its defense judgment, the district court held that Novartis Reps met the requirements of the outside salesperson exemption. Under Section 13(a)(1) of the FLSA, “any employee employed . . . in the capacity of outside salesman” is exempt from the overtime pay requirement. 29 U.S.C. 213(a)(1). DOL regulations define “outside salesman” as any employee “whose primary duty is making sales” while “customarily and regularly engaged away from the employer’s place or places of business in performing such duty.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.500(A).

The parties do not dispute that Novartis Reps were employed “away from the employer’s place of business.” The real issue before the Second Circuit is the meaning of “sales.” The DOL’s brief draws a fine line distinction between the alleged promotional activities of the Reps and actual sales under the FLSA. The latter occurs only when consideration is paid by the client or customer, according to the DOL. Reps do join Novartis’ “sales force” and receive training in both sales techniques and pharmacology. However, FDA regulations bar Reps from selling drugs directly to physicians. Instead, Reps seek to persuade physicians to write prescriptions for Novartis products, ideally resulting in a “close,” i.e., obtaining a physician’s verbal commitment to prescribe Novartis drugs when appropriate. As part of Novartis’ incentive program, between 15% and 25% of the Reps’ salary comes from commission on the number of prescriptions written by physicians within the Reps’ territory. The average salary after incentives is $91,500. Though the DOL admits that the Reps’ duties “bear some of the indicia of sales,” it nevertheless objects to their classification as outside salespersons. In short, unless the Reps actually “make sales,” they do not qualify for the exemption, according to the DOL.

The Degree of “Discretion”

The lower court also held that that “even if [the Reps] are not outside salespersons, they are administrative employees and are still exempt.” In Re Novartis, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 640. The “administrative employee” exemption applies only to employees who exercise discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(3).

In challenging the lower court’s ruling on the “administrative employee” exemption, the DOL urges the Second Circuit to interpret “discretion and independent judgment . . . in the light of all the facts involved in the particular employment situation in which the question arises.” In so doing, the DOL stresses that Reps must follow a prepared script when contacting target physicians, and they are prohibited from deviating from the “core message” in the marketing pitch. Novartis limits dissemination methods to certain pre-approved materials, including drug samples, pamphlets, clinical studies, and visual aids. When presented with the same facts, however, the lower court criticized the plaintiff Reps for characterizing themselves as “mere ‘robots’ or ‘automatons.’” The lower court found that the Reps exercise sufficient discretion in deploying the core messages and supporting materials. For instance, Reps tailor their presentations to the physician’s schedule, patient base, prescribing habits, and even personality. They also set their own daily call schedules, and use personal entertainment budgets to host informational events for physicians on their target lists.

The DOL argues that the district court’s ruling on the administrative exemption is “unpersuasive in its attempt to ‘back-fit’ the FLSA regulations into the pharmaceutical industry’s practices.” However, as noted by the lower court, “[c]ourts routinely hold that employees may exercise discretion and independent judgment, even when they carry out their duties within the confines of a highly regulated industry.”

This entry was written by Michael Harvey.

Photo credit: Tom Varco

In addition to the FIL Training guide, the Department also produced copies of the handwritten employee interview summaries prepared by the investigator on the Department’s “Employee Personal Interview Statement” (WH-31) form. Together, these materials provide a fascinating glimpse into the Department’s internal thinking and strategies on how to conduct employee interviews during FLSA investigations. Some of the key points emphasized in the FIL Training guide include:

• The importance of including the Department’s legal counsel, the Solicitor of Labor (SOL), in the investigation process and consulting with the SOL on “the kind and amount of information needed from interviews in order to resolve the issues presented.” In other words, employers should always assume that the Department is actively consulting with its attorney and preparing for potential litigation during the course of an FLSA investigation.

• The method for determining how many employee interviews should be conducted by the investigator in order to produce a “representative sample.” As explained in the FIL Training guide, with a “small number of affected employees (10 or less), it is reasonable to interview all of them.” By contrast, the guide recommends that with a “large number of employees (100 or more), interview about 20%.”

• Specific suggestions on interview techniques and styles that Department investigators can use to put “an employee at ease” and facilitate “the free flow of pertinent information.”

• The Department’s preferences on interview locations and methods (“[p]ersonal face-to-face interviews are the best method,” while “[t]elephone interviews are acceptable” and “[m]ail interviews are the least desirable”).

• The suggested form and substance of the signed employee interview statements each investigator is required to prepare and obtain at the conclusion of employee interviews.

• The requirement that investigators “evaluate the demeanor, articulateness, self-confidence, and other appropriate characteristics of each witness,” and document that evaluation for future use by the SOL to “determine which employees will be the best witnesses” against the employer in any future litigation.

Each year the Department receives 25,000-30,000 new employee wage complaints under the FLSA. Although only about one percent of these complaints end up in court, the Department’s FIL Training guide shows that the Department conducts each investigation with the understanding that it may result in contested litigation. Given this policy, and the detailed training materials and methods used by the Department to prepare for the possibility of litigation, employers need to ensure that they devote the same time and effort to preparing their response to FLSA wage and hour investigations.

This blog entry was authored by Douglas E. Smith.
 

Section 778.217(d) undermines commuter benefits laws by acting as an inducement for employers not to provide transit subsidies. For example, employers that allow their employees to pay for commuting costs through pre-tax deductions obtain commuter tax benefits and do not incur any additional overtime liability. Conversely, more generous employers that subsidize employees commuting expenses incur overtime liability, which negates the effect of the tax benefit.

There may be a creative solution to this dilemma. Most employers who provide transit subsidies do so through a third party. Employers who provide commuter benefits through a trust or benefit plan should be able to exclude such benefits from the regular rate. The relevant DOL regulation provides that irrevocable contributions to a trust or third party that provides for “old age, retirement, life, accident, or health insurance or similar benefits for employees” are excluded from the regular rate. See 29 C.F.R. § 778.214 In order to qualify for this trust or benefits exemption, the employer must meet the five-part test outlined at 29 C.F.R. § 778.215.

It is unclear whether the DOL or a court would agree that a commuter benefit plan falls within this definition as “a similar [employee] benefit.” Some may argue that this provision should be limited to health and retirement plans. Commuter benefit plans are beneficial for employees, employers, and the environment. As it is in the public interest for employers to provide these subsidies, it is likely that if asked to opine on the issue, the Wage Hour Administrator would find that commuter subsidies are excluded from regular rate if they are provided through a qualified plan or third party. In the absence of such guidance from the DOL, employers should be cautious about structuring these benefits in consideration of their wage and hour obligations.

This blog entry was authored by Salvador Simao.