Wage & Hour Counsel : Wage & Hour Lawyer & Attorney : Littler Mendelson Law Firm : Employment Law, Labor Relations

When the case was considered by the district court, it dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims, finding the Reps were exempt employees under both the “outside sales” and “administrative” exemptions set forth in the FLSA. Analyzing first the outside sales exemption, the district court concluded that even though the Reps “may not ‘sell’” in a “technical[ ]” sense, they do “make sales in the sense that sales are made in the pharmaceutical industry” and therefore they meet the “spirit and the letter” of the outside sales exemption. The district court also found that the Reps meet the administrative exemption, because they “exercise discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance” when they meet with physicians, provide them with information about the company’s products, and attempt to get commitments to prescribe the products. The Second Circuit reversed and held that the Reps do not meet either exemption.

Outside Sales Exemption

The Second Circuit concluded that the Novartis Reps do not meet the requirements of the outside sales exemption because they do not “make sales.” The court relied heavily on the Secretary of Labor’s amicus curiae position that a “sale” requires an exchange of consideration between buyer and seller and that, at best, Reps simply seek a positive affirmation from physicians that they will prescribe Novartis’s products in the future.

Although Novartis argued that the preamble to the regulations accompanying the FLSA provides that “commitments to buy” may constitute “making sales” under the exemption, the court rejected the argument as applied to this case. It held that “[t]he type of ‘commitment’ the Reps seek and sometimes receive from physicians is not a commitment ‘to buy’ and is not even a binding commitment to prescribe.”

Administrative Exemption

The plaintiffs also challenged the application of the administrative exemption based on the degree of discretion the Novartis Reps have in the performance of their duties. The Second Circuit again deferred to the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation of the regulations and her position regarding their application to the facts of the case. It noted that, despite the importance of the Reps’ efforts to promote the company’s products, there was “no evidence in the record that the Reps have any authority to formulate, affect, interpret, or implement Novartis’s management policies or its operating practices, or that they are involved in planning Novartis’s long-term or short-term business objectives, or that they carry out major assignments in conducting the operations of Novartis’s business, or that they have any authority to commit Novartis in matters that have significant financial impact.” Instead, the Second Circuit accepted the plaintiffs’ claim that they do “low-level discretionless marketing work, strictly controlled by Novartis” and concluded that they did not exercise sufficient discretion and independent judgment to satisfy the administrative exemption. 

This entry was written by Lori Alexander, Michael Harvey, and Theresa Waugh.

¹ On the same day the In re Novartis ruling was issued (July 6, 2010), the Second Circuit also issued a summary order in Kuzinski v. Schering Corp., 2d Cir. No. 09-1945-cv, affirming the district court’s denial of summary judgment in a similar case.

Providing context for its decision, the court noted that Congress intended to exclude certain pre- and post-shift activities from work time when it enacted the Portal-to-Portal Act to amend the Fair Labor Standards Act. Under that amendment, as further stated in a persuasive 2006 DOL memorandum, changing clothes under usual circumstances is not compensable. In this case, the City had a policy of allowing officers to dress wherever they preferred, including at home, but required motorcycle officers to dress at home. The Court agreed that to the extent officers elected to dress at work, their decision was strictly a matter of employee convenience, and, as a result, their decision to change clothes at work did not render that time compensable.

The court recognized that previous decisions from the United States Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit allowed compensation for donning and doffing, but in all those cases, changing clothes had to be performed on the employer's premises because of the nature of the work, a policy of the employer, or applicable law. Those cases provided the following three-part test to assess whether pre- and post-shift activities are compensable: (1) does the activity constitute "work"? (2) is the activity an "integral and indispensable duty" of the job?, and (3) is the activity so insignificant in scope and duration as to be excluded from compensability as de minimis?

The court expressed doubt whether the act of changing in and out of a uniform and gear constituted "work," but proceeded to the second prong of the test where the officers' argument "fatally falter[ed]." To be "integral and indispensable, a pre- or post-shift activity must be "necessary to the principal work performed and done for the benefit of the employer." Both the majority and the dissent deemed that the act of donning and doffing a uniform was not integral to the job and, therefore, was not compensable. The majority noted that, although there was no dispute that the uniform and gear was required, the process of donning and doffing was not required to occur at work, and was equally effective whether performed at home or work. There was no mutual obligation fulfilled by donning and doffing at work, and the ultimate decision was a matter of convenience to the employee, not the employer. The dissent also recognized that the uniform may connote authority but does "not assist the officers in making arrests, interviewing witnesses or writing reports," and, therefore, is not integral.

The majority considered the gear used by officers in the same context as (and as part of) their uniform and found it to be indispensable but not integral to the principal duty of law enforcement. The dissent reasoned that the police gear assisted officers in the performance of their principal duty, and, consequently, was both indispensable and integral. The dissent further noted that the time spent donning and doffing gear was most likely a matter of only "seconds, or a few minutes," which would make that time non-compensable as de minimis. The dissent concluded that the case should be remanded because the record does not contain evidence of the amount of time actually required for donning and doffing gear.

This decision is significant for private employers as well. To the extent any employer requires its employees to wear a uniform (or gear), this decision provides a framework for determining whether an employee is entitled to compensation. Although certain factors or set of facts may lead to variations, employers requiring its employees to don and doff uniform and gear at work are likely required to compensate employees for that time—provided it is not de minimis—but employees are generally not entitled to compensation if they have the right to change at home at the beginning and end of their workday.
 

This entry was written by Laurent Badoux.

In Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2010-1, the DOL focused on the “production versus administrative” dichotomy in determining that mortgage loan officers are production workers whose primary duty is making sales, as opposed to administrative workers whose work is directly related to the management or general business operations of their employer or their employer’s customers. See 29 C.F.R. § 541.200.

The DOL relied on the following factors in reaching its conclusion:

• The primary job duties of mortgage loan officers – including collecting financial information from customers, entering it into the computer program to determine what particular loan products might be available to that customer, and explaining the terms of the available options and the pros and cons of each option, so that a sale can be made – constitute the production work of an employer engaged in selling or brokering mortgage loan products;
• Mortgage loan officers are paid primarily by commissions;
• Employers often train their mortgage loan officers in sales techniques and evaluate their performance on the basis of their sales volume;
• Many employers defend against FLSA lawsuits brought by mortgage loan officers by arguing that they are exempt as outside sales employees, thus conceding that their primary duty is sales; and
• Courts have repeatedly held that mortgage loan officers who work inside their employer’s place of business have a primary duty of sales.

The Wage and Hour Division announced that its new Administrator Interpretations “will set forth a general interpretation of the law and regulations, applicable across-the-board to all those affected by the provision in issue. Guidance in this form will be useful in clarifying the law as it relates to an entire industry, a category of employees, or to all employees.” Although the DOL will continue to respond to requests for opinion letters, such responses will be limited to providing references to relevant statutes, regulations, interpretations and cases and will no longer include an analysis of the specific facts presented.

This entry was written by Stephanie L. Hankin.

In addition, the proposed regulations would “modernize” certain recordkeeping requirements by allowing for “automated and electronic recordkeeping systems and methods to take the place of mandatory paper records that are currently required in some instances for employees” who work from home.

The DOL anticipates issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking in August of 2010.

This entry was written by Christopher Kaczmarek.

Under the FLSA, compensation for overtime need not be provided to “any employee...in the capacity as an outside salesperson.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). To qualify as an outside salesperson, (1) the employee’s “primary duty” must be “making sales” or “obtaining orders or contracts,” and (2) he or she must customarily and regularly be engaged away from the employer’s place of business in performing such duty. 29 C.F.R § 541.500(a). Both parties agreed that PSRs met the second requirement, so the only disputed issue was whether their primary duty was making sales.

The FLSA defines sales as “any sale, exchange, contract to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other disposition.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(k). Moreover, sales include “the transfer of title to tangible property, and in certain cases, of tangible and valuable evidences of intangible property.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.501(b). Whether an employee makes sales requires an objective analysis, and according to the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) making sales includes “obtain[ing] a commitment to buy from the customer,” which resulted in the salesperson being “credited with the sale.” U.S. Department of Labor, Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales and Computer Employees, 69 Fed. Reg. 22122, 22162 (Apr. 23, 2004). According to the court, under the DOL regulations, there is no requirement that commitments be binding. All that is required is that a sale be made “in some sense.”

In Christopher, the PSRs argued that they did not make sales because they did not consummate transactions or take orders. Instead, they claimed they merely promoted products. Moreover, PSRs contended their activities did not constitute sales because the U.S. Food and Drug Administration expressly prohibited pharmaceutical companies from selling directly to physicians or patients. According to the PSRs, sales only occurred between the pharmaceutical company and wholesalers.

The court noted that opinions differed among the federal courts whether PSRs made sales. A federal court in Connecticut concluded that PSRs did not qualify for the exemption because they could not sell, and physicians could not buy, products. Ruggeri v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., 585 F. Supp. 2d 254, 268 (D. Conn. 2008). However, a court in New York held that PSRs were exempt because they were credited with sales when physicians wrote prescriptions. In re Novartis Wage & Hour Litigation, 593 F. Supp. 2d 637, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit). To determine whether PSRs qualified as outside salespeople, the court in Christopher looked to the rationale behind the outside sales exemption and also examined the position in the context of the pharmaceutical industry.

According to the court, the characteristics of PSRs justified exemption. PSRs were compensated well above the federal minimum wage (up to $100,000 per year), received fringe benefits like incentive bonuses in lieu of overtime, were unsupervised, and had better opportunities for advancement than non-exempt employees. Additionally, the kind of work they performed was “difficult to standardize to any time frame and could not be easily spread to other workers after 40 hours in a week, making compliance with overtime provisions difficult.” (quoting U.S. Department of Labor, 69 Fed. Reg. at 22124.)

The court observed that although the FLSA was enacted prior to the development of the pharmaceutical sales industry, it was intentionally broad to “address a multiplicity of industries found in the national economy and accordingly provide flexibility in the definition of a ‘sale.’” Moreover, the industry’s unique nature, i.e., the prohibition of direct sales, shifted the focus of sales efforts from the consumer to the physician, thereby making “[a] PSR’s ultimate goal [the] close [of] an encounter with a physician by obtaining a non-binding commitment from the physician to prescribe the PSR’s assigned product.” PSRs worked longer and irregular hours to generate sales in their territory for which they received compensation in the form of bonuses. The court concluded that PSRs “plainly and unmistakably fit within the terms of the exemption” because they engaged in “the functional equivalent of an outside salesperson and to hold otherwise is to ignore reality in favor of form over substance.”

The exempt status of pharmaceutical sales representatives continues to be litigated in courts across the country, and the issue is not settled. In the Novartis appeal referenced above, the U.S. Department of Labor filed an amicus brief arguing that pharmaceutical sales representatives do not qualify for the “outside sales” exemption. 

This entry was written by Robert Pritchard.

¹ Note: In the decision, SmithKlineBeecham is spelled as SmithKleinBeecham, which is an error.

Image credit: Alan Smithee

With this announcement, Secretary Solis promised, "America's workers should rest assured that protecting worker rights is a top priority at the Department of Labor." Her press release warned, "[t]here is no excuse for employers who disregard federal labor standards--especially those that are designed to protect the most vulnerable in the workplace."

Broad Investigative Powers

The Department's Wage and Hour Division investigates allegations that employers failed to pay minimum wage or overtime, as well as alleged misclassification of employees as exempt or independent contractors.¹ DOL investigations can be triggered by complaints from employees, unions, or competitors, and routine audits also can be performed, often focusing on a particular industry or type of employer.

The Department has broad investigative powers, including the power to subpoena employment records. Assuming wage and hour violations are discovered, the Department will seek a settlement. If an out-of-court agreement is not reached, the Department can sue to enjoin an employer's violation of the law as well as to compel the payment of back pay to all employees. The Department also has the power to seek reinstatement with back pay of any individual employee who was discharged for attempting to enforce the law.

Should the Department bring suit and prevail, it will recover liquidated damages equal to the unpaid wages the employer owes, unless the employer can prove that it acted in good faith with a reasonable belief that its pay practices complied with the law. Interest and attorney's fees are likely to be awarded as well, even if liquidated damages are not.

Significant Settlements

The threat of such enforcement actions can result in employers agreeing to settlements that provide significant recoveries. For instance, in July 2009, the Department announced a settlement of almost $750,000 with a convenience store chain in nine states accused of failing to properly include performance-related bonuses in the regular rate used to calculate overtime pay.

The Department also is planning a "public awareness campaign" to inform workers of their "rights," which presumably also will assist the Department in finding errant employers to investigate and prosecute.

Wake-Up Call

The federal government's increased manpower and desire to enforce federal labor standards should be a wake up call to United States employers to ensure that their procedures and practices comply with federal labor laws.

Audits conducted by or through counsel can catch technical problems with pay practices, recordkeeping, and employee classification that can be corrected to reduce exposure. Training of managers in employment laws such as when overtime is required can avoid violations caused by managers' ignorance of legal obligations.

These proactive steps can save employers the expense and embarrassment of reacting to a government investigation or a costly class action.

This entry was written by Alison Hightower.

¹ The Wage and Hour Division also governs the hours and conditions for employment of children under 16 years old and it enforces the labor standards provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that apply to aliens authorized to work in the U.S. under certain nonimmigrant visa programs.

In Re Novartis is a consolidated class action brought by Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives (“Reps”) from California, New York and other states against Novartis Pharmaceutical Corporation, one of the largest drug manufacturers in the United States. Claiming that they were misclassified as exempt employees, the Reps seek overtime wages for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek.

The Meaning of “Sales”

In the first of two justifications for its defense judgment, the district court held that Novartis Reps met the requirements of the outside salesperson exemption. Under Section 13(a)(1) of the FLSA, “any employee employed . . . in the capacity of outside salesman” is exempt from the overtime pay requirement. 29 U.S.C. 213(a)(1). DOL regulations define “outside salesman” as any employee “whose primary duty is making sales” while “customarily and regularly engaged away from the employer’s place or places of business in performing such duty.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.500(A).

The parties do not dispute that Novartis Reps were employed “away from the employer’s place of business.” The real issue before the Second Circuit is the meaning of “sales.” The DOL’s brief draws a fine line distinction between the alleged promotional activities of the Reps and actual sales under the FLSA. The latter occurs only when consideration is paid by the client or customer, according to the DOL. Reps do join Novartis’ “sales force” and receive training in both sales techniques and pharmacology. However, FDA regulations bar Reps from selling drugs directly to physicians. Instead, Reps seek to persuade physicians to write prescriptions for Novartis products, ideally resulting in a “close,” i.e., obtaining a physician’s verbal commitment to prescribe Novartis drugs when appropriate. As part of Novartis’ incentive program, between 15% and 25% of the Reps’ salary comes from commission on the number of prescriptions written by physicians within the Reps’ territory. The average salary after incentives is $91,500. Though the DOL admits that the Reps’ duties “bear some of the indicia of sales,” it nevertheless objects to their classification as outside salespersons. In short, unless the Reps actually “make sales,” they do not qualify for the exemption, according to the DOL.

The Degree of “Discretion”

The lower court also held that that “even if [the Reps] are not outside salespersons, they are administrative employees and are still exempt.” In Re Novartis, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 640. The “administrative employee” exemption applies only to employees who exercise discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(3).

In challenging the lower court’s ruling on the “administrative employee” exemption, the DOL urges the Second Circuit to interpret “discretion and independent judgment . . . in the light of all the facts involved in the particular employment situation in which the question arises.” In so doing, the DOL stresses that Reps must follow a prepared script when contacting target physicians, and they are prohibited from deviating from the “core message” in the marketing pitch. Novartis limits dissemination methods to certain pre-approved materials, including drug samples, pamphlets, clinical studies, and visual aids. When presented with the same facts, however, the lower court criticized the plaintiff Reps for characterizing themselves as “mere ‘robots’ or ‘automatons.’” The lower court found that the Reps exercise sufficient discretion in deploying the core messages and supporting materials. For instance, Reps tailor their presentations to the physician’s schedule, patient base, prescribing habits, and even personality. They also set their own daily call schedules, and use personal entertainment budgets to host informational events for physicians on their target lists.

The DOL argues that the district court’s ruling on the administrative exemption is “unpersuasive in its attempt to ‘back-fit’ the FLSA regulations into the pharmaceutical industry’s practices.” However, as noted by the lower court, “[c]ourts routinely hold that employees may exercise discretion and independent judgment, even when they carry out their duties within the confines of a highly regulated industry.”

This entry was written by Michael Harvey.

Photo credit: Tom Varco

In addition to the FIL Training guide, the Department also produced copies of the handwritten employee interview summaries prepared by the investigator on the Department’s “Employee Personal Interview Statement” (WH-31) form. Together, these materials provide a fascinating glimpse into the Department’s internal thinking and strategies on how to conduct employee interviews during FLSA investigations. Some of the key points emphasized in the FIL Training guide include:

• The importance of including the Department’s legal counsel, the Solicitor of Labor (SOL), in the investigation process and consulting with the SOL on “the kind and amount of information needed from interviews in order to resolve the issues presented.” In other words, employers should always assume that the Department is actively consulting with its attorney and preparing for potential litigation during the course of an FLSA investigation.

• The method for determining how many employee interviews should be conducted by the investigator in order to produce a “representative sample.” As explained in the FIL Training guide, with a “small number of affected employees (10 or less), it is reasonable to interview all of them.” By contrast, the guide recommends that with a “large number of employees (100 or more), interview about 20%.”

• Specific suggestions on interview techniques and styles that Department investigators can use to put “an employee at ease” and facilitate “the free flow of pertinent information.”

• The Department’s preferences on interview locations and methods (“[p]ersonal face-to-face interviews are the best method,” while “[t]elephone interviews are acceptable” and “[m]ail interviews are the least desirable”).

• The suggested form and substance of the signed employee interview statements each investigator is required to prepare and obtain at the conclusion of employee interviews.

• The requirement that investigators “evaluate the demeanor, articulateness, self-confidence, and other appropriate characteristics of each witness,” and document that evaluation for future use by the SOL to “determine which employees will be the best witnesses” against the employer in any future litigation.

Each year the Department receives 25,000-30,000 new employee wage complaints under the FLSA. Although only about one percent of these complaints end up in court, the Department’s FIL Training guide shows that the Department conducts each investigation with the understanding that it may result in contested litigation. Given this policy, and the detailed training materials and methods used by the Department to prepare for the possibility of litigation, employers need to ensure that they devote the same time and effort to preparing their response to FLSA wage and hour investigations.

This blog entry was authored by Douglas E. Smith.
 

Section 778.217(d) undermines commuter benefits laws by acting as an inducement for employers not to provide transit subsidies. For example, employers that allow their employees to pay for commuting costs through pre-tax deductions obtain commuter tax benefits and do not incur any additional overtime liability. Conversely, more generous employers that subsidize employees commuting expenses incur overtime liability, which negates the effect of the tax benefit.

There may be a creative solution to this dilemma. Most employers who provide transit subsidies do so through a third party. Employers who provide commuter benefits through a trust or benefit plan should be able to exclude such benefits from the regular rate. The relevant DOL regulation provides that irrevocable contributions to a trust or third party that provides for “old age, retirement, life, accident, or health insurance or similar benefits for employees” are excluded from the regular rate. See 29 C.F.R. § 778.214 In order to qualify for this trust or benefits exemption, the employer must meet the five-part test outlined at 29 C.F.R. § 778.215.

It is unclear whether the DOL or a court would agree that a commuter benefit plan falls within this definition as “a similar [employee] benefit.” Some may argue that this provision should be limited to health and retirement plans. Commuter benefit plans are beneficial for employees, employers, and the environment. As it is in the public interest for employers to provide these subsidies, it is likely that if asked to opine on the issue, the Wage Hour Administrator would find that commuter subsidies are excluded from regular rate if they are provided through a qualified plan or third party. In the absence of such guidance from the DOL, employers should be cautious about structuring these benefits in consideration of their wage and hour obligations.

This blog entry was authored by Salvador Simao.