The U.S. Department of Labor Urges Second Circuit to Deny FLSA Overtime Exemptions to Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives

On October 14, 2009, the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) filed an amicus brief in a case pending before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, In Re Novartis Wage and Hour Litigation, arguing for a stricter interpretation of “outside salesperson” and “administrative employee” exemptions under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, as applied to pharmaceutical sales representatives. In its brief, the DOL maintains that pharmaceutical sales representatives neither “make sales” nor exercise sufficient discretion to qualify for the exemptions from overtime compensation, urging the Court of Appeals to reverse the district court’s defense judgment below. See In Re Novartis Wage and Hour Litig., 593 F. Supp. 2d 637, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).

In Re Novartis is a consolidated class action brought by Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives (“Reps”) from California, New York and other states against Novartis Pharmaceutical Corporation, one of the largest drug manufacturers in the United States. Claiming that they were misclassified as exempt employees, the Reps seek overtime wages for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek.

The Meaning of “Sales”

In the first of two justifications for its defense judgment, the district court held that Novartis Reps met the requirements of the outside salesperson exemption. Under Section 13(a)(1) of the FLSA, “any employee employed . . . in the capacity of outside salesman” is exempt from the overtime pay requirement. 29 U.S.C. 213(a)(1). DOL regulations define “outside salesman” as any employee “whose primary duty is making sales” while “customarily and regularly engaged away from the employer’s place or places of business in performing such duty.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.500(A).

The parties do not dispute that Novartis Reps were employed “away from the employer’s place of business.” The real issue before the Second Circuit is the meaning of “sales.” The DOL’s brief draws a fine line distinction between the alleged promotional activities of the Reps and actual sales under the FLSA. The latter occurs only when consideration is paid by the client or customer, according to the DOL. Reps do join Novartis’ “sales force” and receive training in both sales techniques and pharmacology. However, FDA regulations bar Reps from selling drugs directly to physicians. Instead, Reps seek to persuade physicians to write prescriptions for Novartis products, ideally resulting in a “close,” i.e., obtaining a physician’s verbal commitment to prescribe Novartis drugs when appropriate. As part of Novartis’ incentive program, between 15% and 25% of the Reps’ salary comes from commission on the number of prescriptions written by physicians within the Reps’ territory. The average salary after incentives is $91,500. Though the DOL admits that the Reps’ duties “bear some of the indicia of sales,” it nevertheless objects to their classification as outside salespersons. In short, unless the Reps actually “make sales,” they do not qualify for the exemption, according to the DOL.

The Degree of “Discretion”

The lower court also held that that “even if [the Reps] are not outside salespersons, they are administrative employees and are still exempt.” In Re Novartis, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 640. The “administrative employee” exemption applies only to employees who exercise discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance. 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(3).

In challenging the lower court’s ruling on the “administrative employee” exemption, the DOL urges the Second Circuit to interpret “discretion and independent judgment . . . in the light of all the facts involved in the particular employment situation in which the question arises.” In so doing, the DOL stresses that Reps must follow a prepared script when contacting target physicians, and they are prohibited from deviating from the “core message” in the marketing pitch. Novartis limits dissemination methods to certain pre-approved materials, including drug samples, pamphlets, clinical studies, and visual aids. When presented with the same facts, however, the lower court criticized the plaintiff Reps for characterizing themselves as “mere ‘robots’ or ‘automatons.’” The lower court found that the Reps exercise sufficient discretion in deploying the core messages and supporting materials. For instance, Reps tailor their presentations to the physician’s schedule, patient base, prescribing habits, and even personality. They also set their own daily call schedules, and use personal entertainment budgets to host informational events for physicians on their target lists.

The DOL argues that the district court’s ruling on the administrative exemption is “unpersuasive in its attempt to ‘back-fit’ the FLSA regulations into the pharmaceutical industry’s practices.” However, as noted by the lower court, “[c]ourts routinely hold that employees may exercise discretion and independent judgment, even when they carry out their duties within the confines of a highly regulated industry.”

This entry was written by Michael Harvey.

Photo credit: Tom Varco

Federal Court Rules that California Employers are Liable for Double Premium Pay for Missed Meal and Rest Breaks

In a blow to UPS, and other employers in California, a California federal court recently ruled that employers are liable for up to two hours of additional pay when an employee misses both a meal and rest break. California law provides for a one hour premium of regular pay for each day that a non-exempt employee is not provided meal or rest breaks as required by the various California Wage Orders. (California Labor Code sec. 226.7).

Employers have argued that under California law, an employer is only obligated to pay a one hour premium for missed meal and lunch breaks per day, whether there was one or multiple violations in the same day. In the first direct ruling on this issue, the court in Marlo v. United Parcel Service, Case No. CV 03-04336 DDP, held that the employee may recover up to two additional hours of pay on a single work day for meal period and rest break violations: one if any meal period violations occur in a work day and one if any rest break violations occur in a work day. However, if more than one rest period violation occurs in a single work day but no meal period violations occur, the employee may only recover one additional hour of pay for all of the rest period violations combined; likewise, if more than one meal period violation occurs in a single work day but no rest period violations occur on that day, the employee may only recover one additional hour of pay for all of the meal period violations combined.

While the ruling will likely be appealed, employers should evaluate their pay practices with respect to missed meal and rest periods to comply with the ruling until further authority is established. On a positive note, the Court agreed with other recent rulings and held that an employer's obligation with respect to meal breaks is to make a meal period available to employees, but places them under no further obligations to ensure that a meal break is taken. This issue is currently pending a decision by the California Supreme Court in Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (Hohnbaum).

This blog entry was authored by Gregory G. Iskander.
 

California Court of Appeal Holds No Punitive Damages Available for Wide Variety of Labor Code Violations

For the past several years, plaintiffs have routinely sought punitive damages in their wage and hour actions under the California Labor Code. A December 3, 2008 decision by the California Court of Appeals for the Fourth Appellate District may put a stop to that practice.

The plaintiff in Brewer v. Premier Golf Properties sued her former employer for denying her meal and rest breaks, failing to pay her minimum wage for all hours worked, and not providing her with accurate itemized wage statements. The jury awarded the plaintiff $26,300 in unpaid wages and penalties and, after finding that the defendant employer had engaged in malice, awarded the plaintiff an additional $195,000 in punitive damages.

The court of appeal reversed the punitive damages award on two grounds. First, the court held that the Labor Code statutes regulating pay stubs (§ 226), minimum wages (§ 1197.1), meal breaks (§ 512) and rest breaks all create new rights and obligations not previously existing in the common law. Those statutes also established detailed remedial schemes for the rights they created. Accordingly, the court concluded that those Labor Code provisions fell within the long-standing “new right-exclusive remedy” doctrine, which provides that “where a statute creates new rights and obligations not previously existing in the common law, the express statutory remedy is deemed to be the exclusive remedy available for statutory violations, unless it is inadequate.” The plaintiff did not raise, and the court did not address, the question of under what circumstances a statutory remedy would be deemed inadequate. 

The court also noted that punitive damages are ordinarily limited to actions “for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract.” Although the plaintiff’s claims for unpaid wages, failure to provide meal/rest breaks and improper wage statements were all based upon statutory provisions, the statutory provisions apply only when the parties have entered into an employment contract and are therefore obligations “arising from the employment contract.” Accordingly, the court viewed the defendant’s violation of the Labor Code provisions as a breach of obligations arising from its employment contract with the plaintiff for which punitive damages were not available.

The good news for employers is that the court’s reasoning can be applied to a wide variety of Labor Code provisions, many of which apply only in the context of the employment relationship. 

Marlene Muraco authored this blog entry.