Seventh Circuit Finds Intrastate Drivers Making Wine Deliveries Are Exempt From Overtime

In Collins v. Heritage Wine Cellars Ltd. (7th Cir., No. 09-1181, Dec. 21, 2009), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the extent to which drivers who delivered wine exclusively within the State of Illinois were engaged in interstate commerce and, therefore, not entitled to overtime under the Motor Carrier Act exemption to the Fair Labor Standards Act. Specifically, this exemption from overtime applies to employees of a motor carrier if “property ... [is] transported by [the] motor carrier between a place in a State and a place in another State,” provided the employees “engage in activities of a character directly affecting the safety of operation of motor vehicles in the transportation on the public highways of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act.” As the court noted, “[t]he shipment itself must be in some sense interstate commerce (transportation between a place in a state and a place in another state).”

In Collins, drivers working for a wholesale importer and distributor of wine picked up the wine from its employer’s warehouse in Chicago and delivered the wine to retail stores in Chicago and other areas of Illinois. Although the employees never made deliveries outside of Illinois, their employer controlled the wine from the time its independent contractors picked up the wine from the state or country of origin until the time its drivers (the plaintiffs) ultimately delivered the wine to a retail outlet in Illinois. The wine did not undergo any alteration on its trip from the vineyard to a retail store, nor was it subject to any processing, deliberate aging, adding of preservatives, or re-labeling. Rather, “[w]hen the wine arrives at the warehouse, it is taken off the shrink-wrapped pallets on which it is delivered and shelved in the warehouse, period.”

In concluding that the drivers were engaged in interstate commerce bringing them within the Motor Carrier Act exemption from overtime, the Seventh Circuit found that the drivers’ delivery of wine exclusively within Illinois amounted to the last segment of an uninterrupted single interstate shipment originating from the locations where the wine had been produced. According to the Seventh Circuit:

“It seems to us that when a shipper transports his product across state lines for sale by him to customers in the destination state, and the product undergoes no alteration during its journey to the shipper’s customer, and interruptions in the journey that occur in the destination state are no more than the normal stops or stages that are common in interstate sales, such as temporary warehousing, the entire journey should be regarded as having taken place in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act’s exemption from the [FLSA]."

As a result, the court affirmed the district court's holding that the drivers were engaged in interstate commerce and, therefore, exempt from overtime under the FLSA.

While at first blush the decision in Collins appears to be favorable to employers, the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that the drivers were engaged in interstate commerce was limited to the facts before it. Accordingly, employers with drivers who deliver goods within a single state must evaluate the overall process for delivery of goods from start to finish before concluding that the Motor Carrier Act exemption applies.

This entry was written by Jennifer L. Mora.

Photo credit: MobiusDaXter
 

Eleventh Circuit Finds Bus Drivers Exempt from FLSA's Overtime Provisions

Photo by Akton

On July 23, 2009, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of American Coach Lines of Miami, Inc. (ACLM). The court held that the plaintiffs, current and former bus drivers of ACLM, qualified for the motor carrier exemption to the federal Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA) and were therefore not entitled to overtime compensation. Walters, et al. v. American Coach Lines of Miami, Inc., No. 08-15636, 2009 WL 2182419 (11th Cir. July 23, 2009). ACLM’s business operations included, among other things, shuttling cruise ship passengers via bus between the Miami and Fort Lauderdale airports and local hotels and cruise ship ports under contract with cruise lines.

In reaching its conclusion, the court first determined that ACLM was subject to the Secretary of Transportation’s jurisdiction under the Motor Carrier Act (MCA) because ACLM was licensed by the Department of Transportation (DOT), held all of the required authorizations from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, and had been audited in the past by the DOT. Additionally, ACLM provided bus services that crossed state lines, derived approximately four percent (4%) of its revenue from interstate trips, and held itself out as an interstate motor carrier. Notably, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ de minimis argument – i.e. that ACLM did not fall under the Secretary of Transportation’s jurisdiction because it did not engage in a sufficient number of interstate trips – noting that analysis of the de minimis question requires consideration of both the number of interstate trips made and the percentage of revenue generated by those trips, and suggesting that the de minimis requirement may be altogether inapplicable in situations where a company holds the appropriate federal licensing and there is undisputed proof of some travel across state lines.

The court next determined that the plaintiffs’ activities – even though primarily intrastate in nature – constituted “interstate commerce” as that term is used in the MCA because they were part of the continuous stream of interstate travel. Specifically, ACLM’s airport-to-seaport routes “share a practical continuity of movement with the interstate or international travel of the cruise lines and their passengers ... [f]or cruise ship passengers arriving at the airport or seaport, ACLM’s shuttle rides would be part of the continuous stream of interstate travel that is their cruise vacation.” 2009 WL 2182419, at *6.

Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments for limiting the Secretary of Transportation’s jurisdiction over their work-related activities, concluding that: (1) neither the plain language of the MCA, nor the plain language of the FLSA, limit the Secretary of Transportation’s jurisdiction solely to transportation that actually crosses state lines; (2) the MCA’s “incidental-to-air” exemption, 49 U.S.C. § 13506(a)(8)(A), did not divest the Secretary of Transportation’s jurisdiction over ACLM with respect to regulation of maximum hours of work; and (3) to the extent a through-ticketing arrangement was required for ACLM’s airport-to-seaport routes to constitute interstate commerce, ACLM demonstrated that such an arrangement in fact existed.

This blog post was authored by Jeffrey Timmerman.