Wage & Hour Counsel : Wage & Hour Lawyer & Attorney : Littler Mendelson Law Firm : Employment Law, Labor Relations

By Andrew Voss

In a case that explicitly acknowledges a consequential circuit split, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that the time that an employee spends walking from the locker room to his work station after changing into work clothes is not compensable if the applicable collective bargaining agreement does not require compensation for the time spent changing clothes. Sandifer v. United States Steel Corporation, Nos. 10-1821, 10-1866 (7th Cir. May 8, 2012). The Seventh Circuit’s decision acknowledges a contrary holding in Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2010), but concludes that the Sixth Circuit was “clearly wrong.” The Seventh Circuit also considered and rejected the Department of Labor’s position, as articulated in recent opinion letters and in a brief filed as amicus curiae on the plaintiffs’ behalf, finding that the Department’s “gyrating agency letters” offered little to assist the court in its deliberations other than a political perspective on the law, and therefore were entitled to no deference.

The case focuses on the impact of Section 3(o) of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(o), which excludes “any time spent in changing clothes or washing at the beginning or end of each workday” from working time, if such time is excluded by the express terms or by custom or practice under a bona fide collective bargaining agreement. U.S. Steel’s hourly employees complained that they were owed additional wages for time spent putting on and taking off protective gear in a locker room, and walking to and from the locker room to their work stations. The applicable collective bargaining agreements did not require compensation for changing clothes, and the district court found that the exclusion under Section 3(o) applied. The court determined that the travel time to the employees’ work stations may be compensable, however, but certified the issue for appeal. The Seventh Circuit accepted the appeal.
 

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By Christopher Anderson

The Tennessee General Assembly recently amended the state’s meal and rest break law to require meal breaks for tipped employees in the food and beverage industry. Fortunately, the new law also allows tipped employees to waive their right to meal breaks as long as employers follow a very specific process.

Under Tennessee law, employers must grant employees a 30-minute unpaid meal break unless the nature of the business provides “ample opportunity [for employees] to take an appropriate meal break.” Before the recent amendment, Tennessee employers in the food and beverage industry were not obligated to grant rest breaks to their tipped employees. In the interest of providing regulatory guidance to employers in the industry, the Tennessee Department of Labor determined that waiters and waitresses fall within the exception to the meal break requirement because, by the nature of the business in which they work, there is ample opportunity to take a meal break. As a result of the Tennessee DOL’s guidance, employers in the food and beverage industry were able to avoid disruptions in service caused by meal breaks and provide the uninterrupted attention that is vital to customer satisfaction.

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By Libby Henninger

The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments today in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., a case to determine whether pharmaceutical sales representatives (PSRs) qualify for the outside sales exemption under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The Supreme Court’s opinion will settle a split between the Second and Ninth Circuits in which the Second Circuit held that PSRs are not making sales under the FLSA and – in the underlying case – the Ninth Circuit held that they are, qualifying them as outside sales employees. A broader issue to be decided by the Court is the level of deference owed to a regulatory agency that announces new substantive positions through amicus curiae filings. Here, the Second Circuit’s opinion was largely based on a position taken by the Department of Labor (DOL) through an amicus brief where it advocated that the PSRs do not qualify for an exemption to the FLSA’s overtime requirements. The Ninth Circuit rejected the DOL’s position, finding it need not be afforded deference under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).

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By Julie Dunne and Alison Hightower

The California Supreme Court’s much-anticipated decision regarding how employers are supposed to manage meal periods and rest breaks is finally here! The unanimous decision in Brinker Restaurant Corporation v. Superior Court was issued today, and it is largely a win for California employers. Littler will sponsor webinars providing a detailed analysis of the decision on April 17, 2012, from 10 to 11 a.m. PST, and on April 26 from 10 to 11 a.m. PST. In the meantime, here are the highlights.

Duty to Relieve Employees of Duty

The California Supreme Court held that an employer must relieve employees of all duty during their meal period, with the employee thereafter at liberty to use the meal period for his or her own purpose. Importantly, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the California Wage Order requires employers to ensure that no work is done during an employee’s meal period. If an employee continues to work after the employer relinquishes control, the employer will be liable for straight pay only when it knew or reasonably should have known that the worker was working through the authorized meal period. The court thus clarified that premium pay (an extra one hour’s wage) is not owed when the employer relinquishes control and the employee nevertheless continues to work.

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Earlier this week, GlaxoSmithKline PLC, formerly known as SmithKline Beecham Corporation, filed its brief in the U.S. Supreme Court in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corporation, one of the only Supreme Court cases to address the overtime exemptions under the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the first to address the criteria for the outside sales exemption. At issue is whether pharmaceutical sales representatives qualify for the outside sales exemption because pharmaceuticals are generally purchased by end-users at pharmacies, which purchase from wholesale distributors. The Court's decision may have far-reaching implications, not only for the pharmaceutical industry, but also for other industries that depend on representatives to call on customers at their place of business to generate sales, although the actual sales orders are placed by customers through a centralized order and distribution center or similar process. The case is also significant because it may determine the extent to which courts are required to defer to U.S. Department of Labor's changing interpretations of federal employment statutes and regulations. To learn more about the case and its potential implications for employers, please continue reading Littler's ASAP, Supreme Court to Decide Significant Case on the Outside Sales Overtime Exemption, by Richard Black and Bradley Strawn. To learn more about how the case progressed through the courts, please see our previous posts on the trial court decision, the appellate court decision, and the Supreme Court agreeing to review and resolve the matter.

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By Jeanne Barber

As we reported earlier, the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development (DLWD)amended its wage and hour regulations in September 2011 to eliminate inconsistencies between state and federal overtime law. In so doing, the DLWD inadvertently omitted the exemption for commissioned sales employees, commonly referred to as the “inside sales” exemption, from the amendment. The DLWD’s mistake, which it acknowledged was inadvertent, potentially put employers at risk for misclassification lawsuits.

Now, however, the DLWD has corrected its error, and on February 21, 2012, the exemption was fully restored. The regulation now defines “administrative” employee to include an employee whose: (1) primary duty is sales; (2) total compensation is comprised of at least 50% commissions; and (3) total compensation is $400 or more per week.

Notably, the restored New Jersey “inside sales” exemption differs from the exemptions available under federal law. As a result, employers should carefully analyze whether their commissioned sales employees qualify as exempt under both state and federal law.

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According to a recently-released Field Assistance Bulletin, the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division (WHD) has advised its staff to uniformly enforce a rule that became effective on May 5, 2011 governing ownership of employee tips under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). In many states employers are permitted to take a “tip credit,” or pay employees less than the minimum wage so long as the employees receive sufficient tip income to make up the difference. The new WHD tip rule stipulates, among other things, that tips are the property of the employee regardless of whether the employer has taken a tip credit under section 3(m) of the FLSA, and that an employer is prohibited from using an employee’s tips for any reason other than as a tip credit or in furtherance of a legitimate tip pool. The bulletin sent to WHD regional administrators and district directors emphasizes that this rule will be enforced in all states, even the nine states under the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit. To learn more about the bulletin and its potential implications for employers, please continue reading at Littler's Washington D.C. Employment Law Update.

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By Chris Kaczmarek

In a case of first impression, a Massachusetts Superior Court judge recently held that an employer may adopt a policy prohibiting employees from accepting tips from customers without violating the Massachusetts Tips Law. Any such policy, however, must clearly and conspicuously be announced to customers, such that a reasonable customer would understand that any money left by the customer would not be given to employees as a tip.

In Meshna v. Scrivanos, a number of employees who worked at Dunkin’ Donuts franchises sued the owner/operator of those franchises, claiming that the stores’ no-tips policy violated Massachusetts law. The policy required employees to return tips to customers. According to the complaint, if the employee was unable to return a tip to a customer, then the employee was required to put the tip in the register to be retained by management.

The defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Massachusetts law permits employers to have a no-tipping policy. The court agreed with the defendant’s argument in principle, holding that the Massachusetts Tips Law does not prohibit “a no-tipping policy that is clearly and conspicuously announced” to customers such that a reasonable customer would understand that any money left by the customer would not be given to employees as a tip.

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By Martha Keon

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) provides that an employer may not: “discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to [the Act], or has testified or is about to testify in such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee.”

The meaning of the phrase “filed any complaint” was recently clarified by the U.S. Supreme Court in Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp. to include unwritten, oral complaints as long as “a reasonable, objective person would have understood the employee to have put the employer on notice that the employee is asserting statutory rights under the Act.” While the Supreme Court seemed to have decided by implication whether “filed any complaint” includes internal complaints to the employer, the majority in Kasten stated that it was declining to reach the conclusion, leaving the circuit split on that issue unresolved. The Fourth Circuit took up the issue of “internal complaints” in Minor v. Bostwick Laboratories Inc. 

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